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Abstract
Together with the tremendous growth of civil aviation in the last decades, the importance
of aviation security and its public perception have dramatically increased. Despite of large
technological progress in X-ray imaging such as high-resolution image quality and image
enhancement features, the final decision whether a luggage piece will enter an aircraft or
not is always made by a human operator. Therefore, human factors are still the essential key
element in aviation security worldwide. Even if no technological equipment will replace
human operators from the X-ray screening task in the near future, EU audits and covert
tests have sometimes shown serious operational deficiencies at the checkpoints.
The core subject of this thesis is mainly about image based factors that affect threat detec-
tion performance of human screeners that operate the X-ray equipments at security check-
points. Schwaninger, Hardmeier, and Hofer (2004) have identified three image based fac-
tors: View Difficulty, Superposition and Bag Complexity. In my thesis I developed compu-
tational image measurements to automatically estimate such image based factors. There-
fore a series of adaptations to these three concepts have been necessary for computational
implementation. In this thesis I finally ended up with the following new concepts: Threat
Category, View Difficulty, Superposition, Opacity and Clutter constituting Bag Complex-
ity, and Bag Size as a new factor. Applying statistical models to these image based factors
allows investigating the concerted impact of these image based factors on threat detection.
All reported studies revealed that it is possible to predict average detection performance on
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a single image quite well solely based on computationally accessible image properties.
Since detection performance in visual search tasks depends on the stimulus material (im-
age based factors) but also on human factors, human factors should not be neglected in a
comprehensive model. Therefore in later works also Training and Age were included into
our statistical models. This allows comparing the impact of image based factors and human
factors. Applications of a computational model for threat image projection systems and for
adaptive computer-based training are discussed.
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Chapter 1
Introduction and Summary
1.1 Structure of this thesis
This thesis falls naturally into four parts, which are highly inter-dependent. Each of the
four chapters consists of a self-contained study elaborating our statistical model to eventu-
ally predict threat detection performance on the basis of image based factors. These four
chapters compose the theoretical content core of this thesis.
• Introduction of the primal statistical model with a pilot study (Chapter 2)
• Model consolidation study based on a large data set (Chapter 3)
• Consolidation of the previous findings (Chapter 4)
• An example of how the statistical model proved to be valuable in the political decision-
making processes (Chapter 5)
1
2 Chapter 1: Introduction and Summary
1.1.1 Chapter 2: The Model Commencements
As already mentioned, this chapter shows the first commencements in the development of a
statistical model, which allows to estimate the difficulty of an x-ray image, solely based on
predictor variables that can be automatically computed with the aid of image measurement
algorithms. The study itself consists of four parts, each representing an experiment or an
analysis. The actual experiment is a replication of an earlier study based on the X-Ray
Object Recognition Test (X-Ray ORT) and is basically used to generate data to work on.
This test consisted of 256 X-ray images, containing guns and knives as prohibited threat
items, the participants sample consisted of 12 undergraduate students and the hit rate was
used as the threat detection performance measure. The second experiment consisted in a
rating experiment, where participants were asked to rate the X-Ray ORT images in terms
of four image based factors. Except for minor amplifications and ameliorations these four
image based factors will not significantly change over the course of this thesis. Bivariate
correlations between these ratings and hit rates from Experiment 1 were all significant. In
the third part we introduced a first set of mathematical/computational implementations of
the image based factors. The perceptual plausibilities of these mathematical implementa-
tions were tested applying bivariate correlations between these image measurements and
the human ratings. Finally, the last part of this study introduces the statistical model, apply-
ing multiple linear regression analysis to the image based factors as predictor variables to
predict the hit rate. Thereby we contrasted the model using human ratings with the model
using image measurements as predictor variables. The two models turned out equivalent
regarding their predictive power.
1.1.2 Chapter 3: Model Consolidation I - Getting to the Bottom
As can be understood from the heading, in this chapter I report an extensive amplifica-
tion of the study presented in Chapter 2. Basically, the statistical model using the image
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measurements as predictor variables is put on a firm footing regarding the data set size.
The X-ray image interpretation test used in this study consists of 2048 trials, and the par-
ticipants sample consisted of 90 professional screeners from two European airports, as
opposed to the 256 trial images and 12 undergraduate students in chapter 2. Guns, knives,
improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and other, a threat item rest category, were included
as threat items. Further the conducted analyses included three additional factors. Besides
the original four image based factors View Difficulty, Superposition, Clutter and Opacity
(equivalent to Transparency in Chapter 2) Bag Size was included in this study as a fifth
image based factor. This lead to the necessity of some adaptations of the original image
based factors. The other two additional factors were the human factors Training and Age.
Unlike in the study reported in Chapter 2, d′ was used as the main threat detection per-
formance measure in this study. Several different types of statistical analyses were then
conducted. To get a first impression of how the single factors affect threat detection perfor-
mance isolated from the other factors we started with bivariate correlations between them
and d′. Applying two multiple linear regression analyses separately on the image based
factors and the human factors allowed us to estimate the concerted predictive power of our
factors. We are very happy to present the achieved explained variances of nearly 70% for
both, the image based factors regression model as well as for the human factors regression
model. Furthermore the same models were applied to each threat category separately. With
the model based on the image based factors we achieved an R2 = .60 for guns, R2 = .70
for knives, R2 = .34 for IEDs and an R2 of .77 for the threat category ’other’. With the
model using the human factors Training and Age as predictor variables an R2 = .61 was
achieved for guns, R2 = .59 for knives, R2 = .73 for IEDs and an R2 of .65 for ’other’.
Here we encounter a very interesting data pattern. In short, the image measurements model
prediction is clearly much weaker for IEDs than for all other categories. The exact oppo-
site pattern can be observed with the human factors model. Finally we report an analysis of
covariance (ANCOVA) which allows to investigate possible interaction effects among all
our predictor variables. Results and characteristic data patterns are discussed in detail in
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the Discussion section at the end of the chapter.
1.1.3 Chapter 4: Model Consolidation II - Completing the Circle
The study reported in Chapter 4 brings us back to the same structure as in Chapter 2. The
four parts introduced in Chapter 2 are completed with an Experiment 5 part in this chapter.
Experiments 1 - 4 are replications of the four experiments presented in Chapter 2 on a par-
ticipants sample of nineteen highly experienced aviation security X-ray screening experts.
Unlike in the study reported in Chapter 2 the signal detection measure d′ was used as the
threat detection performance measurement in this study. In contrast to the hit rate alone,
d′ takes into account the false alarm rate as well. Generally, the findings from Chapter
2 could be replicated almost perfectly1 even though detection performance d′ was mea-
sured for experts instead of the hit rates for unexperienced undergraduate students. Only
the overall predictive power of the statistical model slightly decreased. It can be assumed,
that this happened due a certain ceiling effect because the X-Ray ORT seems to be too
easy for highly experienced X-ray screeners. Therefore we replicated the statistical model
on image measurements in Experiment 4 again on a much larger data set in Experiment
5. The underlying X-ray image interpretation test was the same as introduced in Chapter
3, but was completed by a participants sample of 63 professional X-ray screeners from
one European airport. Basically this experiment is a replication of the statistical models in
Chapter 3 applied separately to each threat category. Compared to the models in Chapter 3
explained variance slightly decreased, but the characteristic data patterns remained stable,
as was expected.
1Please note that for some image measurement formulae the direction of effect changed from Chapter 2
to Chapter 3
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1.1.4 Chapter 5: Appliance in the Political Decision-Making Process
I decided to put this study at the end of the core part of this thesis to top it off. I can antic-
ipate that the study presented in Chapter 5 built the scientific fundamentals regarding the
decision-making process in the Technical Task Force of the European Civil Aviation Con-
ference (ECAC TTF) whether a general bag size restriction should be established in Europe.
The ECAC Technical Task Force holds an advisory function within the European Union.
In autumn 2007 several requests have been made to introduce a new European regulation
whereupon cabin baggage size should be restricted to IATA bag size2. We can proudly af-
firm that this study was the decisive factor in this political decision-making process. Based
on this study the ECAC TTF has withdrawn its bag size restriction recommendation. The
study was conducted on behalf of the UK Department for Transport (DfT) in collaboration
with QinetiQ Ltd. In Chapter 5 I present the two core experiments of the study, both con-
ducted by University of Zurich.
As already mentioned, the study presented in Chapter 5 consists of two independent ex-
periments which both investigated the relative importance of our five different image based
factors including Bag Size in mediating threat detection performance of human operators in
airport security X-ray screening. Experiment 1 was based on a random sample of roughly
16’000 threat image projection (TIP) data records judged by approximately 700 profes-
sional X-ray screeners throughout the first half of 2007. TIP is software function available
on state-of-art X-ray screening equipment that allows the projection of fictional threat items
(FTIs) into the X-ray images of passenger bags during the routine baggage screening oper-
ation. χ2-analyses revealed that the image based factors View Difficulty, Superposition and
Opacity can substantially affect threat detection performance in terms of the hit rate (identi-
fication of FTIs; no false alarms could be recorded, because bags could not be controlled).
Clutter and Bag Size on the other hand had no significant (negative) effect. Experiment
2IATA the International Air Transport Association advises passengers to travel by airplane with cabin
baggages with the measures of no more than 45cm x 56cm x 25cm (IATA bag size).
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2 was conducted using the offline-test introduced in the Chapters 3 and 4. Additionally,
Training was included in the analyses to demonstrate the limited effectiveness of a regu-
lation like bag size restriction compared to a quite simple intervention such as mandatory
X-ray image interpretation training for professional aviation security X-ray screeners. 200
professional X-ray screeners from five European airports with varying amounts of training
in X-ray image interpretation agreed in participating in this experiment. As in Chapter 3,
we applied bivariate correlations, regression modeling and an analysis of covariance to the
data. The results correspond very well to the results in Experiment 1. By far the largest
effects were obtained with View Difficulty, Superposition and Training. Opacity showed
medium effect sizes and Clutter and Bag Size showed no or very small effects, respectively.
Concrete recommendations for improving X-ray image interpretation competency aviation
at security check-points are given at the end of this chapter.
1.2 The whole purpose of such a statistical model and im-
age measurements
The disposability of statistical models and automatically computable image measurements
is highly valuable to estimate difficulties of X-ray images regarding threat detection per-
formance. Statistical models on the one hand allow estimating general X-ray image inter-
pretation difficulties. This allows taking into account differences in image difficulties in
case that screener competencies are being assessed based on different stimulus material.
For example, once a statistical model can explain a satisfying amount of variance in de-
tection performance, TIP3 data could be used to directly assess X-ray image interpretation
competency without standardization. To date this is still too unfair, since TIP events differ
very much in their respective difficulties. Beside the fact that the image measurements are
3Threat image projection (see Chapter 5 for details)
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essential to build statistical models, they are very valuable for estimating screeners’ indi-
vidual strengths and weaknesses in dealing with the different image based factors. This
fact can be used to design algorithms to guide individually adaptive training systems or
TIP. State-of-the-art training systems as well as TIP systems allow to permanently record
all actions and responses of the operator, well-defined by its user id, anonymous or not. To-
gether with the possibility of controlling the stimulus material regarding our image based
factors this allows to present to each operator images whose factors specifically correspond
to the screeners’ individual strengths and weaknesses. Learning success is known to be
largest if the task difficulties are slightly challenging, i.e. the tasks should neither be too
easy nor too difficult to solve successfully.
1.3 Security sensitive data
Since this thesis is based on a series of studies in collaboration with aviation security agen-
cies, airports or security companies, who agreed in supplying us with security sensitive data
for research, we highly respect and adhere to their terms and conditions regarding publica-
tion of sensitive data. Therefore I apologize that in some of the reported studies data are
published in a way that no information is given that can be used to infer actual states of
security of different airport or countries. In these cases detection performance mean values
are not reported, airports of countries are not mentioned by name and graphs are displayed
without values on the detection performance scales.
Chapter 2
The Model - Commencements
2.1 A Statistical Approach for Image Difficulty Estima-
tion in X-Ray Screening Using Image Measurements
The relevance of aviation security has increased dramatically at the beginning of this cen-
tury. One of the most important tasks is the visual inspection of passenger bags using
x-ray machines. In this study, we investigated the role of image based factors on human
detection of prohibited items in x-ray images. Schwaninger et al. (2004) and Schwaninger,
Hardmeier, and Hofer (2005) have identified three image based factors: View Difficulty,
Superposition and Bag Complexity. This article consists of 4 experiments which lead to the
development of a statistical model that is able to predict image difficulty based on these im-
age based factors. Experiment 1 is a replication of earlier findings confirming the relevance
of image based factors as defined by Schwaninger, Hardmeier, and Hofer (2005) on X-ray
detection performance. In Experiment 2, we found significant correlations between human
ratings of image based factors and human detection performance. In Experiment 3, we
introduced our image measurements and found significant correlations between them and
8
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human detection performance. Moreover, significant correlations were found between our
image measurements and corresponding human ratings, indicating high perceptual plau-
sibility. In Experiment 4, it was shown using multiple linear regression analysis that our
image measurements can predict human performance as well as human ratings can. Ap-
plications of a computational model for threat image projection systems and for adaptive
computer-based training are discussed.
2.2 Introduction
The relevance of aviation security has increased dramatically in recent years and there has
been substantial progress regarding screening technology, especially in the field of auto-
matic explosive detection systems (Ying, Naidu, & Crawford, 2006). However, the last
decision is always made by a human operator and investigating human factors as essential
determinants of security screening performance has become an important research topic.
First contributions in the field of X-ray image inspection were based on research in medical
image interpretation (Gale, Mugglestone, Purdy, & McClumpha, 2000). Krupinski, Berger,
Dallas, and Roehrig (2003) were able to identify important factors that influence pulmonary
nodule detection. Experimental psychology studies (Ghylin, Drury, & Schwaninger, 2006)
and eye movement research (McCarley, Kramer, Wickens, Vidoni, & Boot, 2004; Liu,
Gale, Purdy, & Song, 2006) have been useful to better understand visual search and per-
ceptual learning in X-ray image interpretation. A series of studies conducted in recent
years has provided converging evidence for the importance of scientifically based selec-
tion, training, and testing methods to achieve and maintain high levels of performance in
X-ray image interpretation (Schwaninger, 2005b, 2006b).
The aim of this study is to develop and evaluate a statistical model for image difficulty
estimation in X-ray screening using image measurements. Schwaninger, Hardmeier, and
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Hofer (2005) could show that there are three major image based factors which affect de-
tection performance: View difficulty depending on the rotation of an object, Superposition
by other objects in the bag, and Bag Complexity, which comprises Clutter, the bag’s back-
ground texture unsteadiness, and Transparency, the relative size of dark areas in the bag.
Figure 1 illustrates the three image based factors as proposed by Schwaninger, Hardmeier,
and Hofer (2005).
Figure 2.1: Illustration of the three major image based factors suggested by Schwaninger,
Hardmeier, and Hofer (2005).
A model for image difficulty estimation using automated image measurements and human
performance statistics can be very useful for threat image projection (TIP) data analysis
and adaptive computer based training (CBT). TIP is a software function of state-of-the art
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X-ray machines which allows the automated insertion of fictional threat items (FTIs) into
X-ray images of real passenger bags. TIP systems are operational in several countries and
used to enhance motivation and attention of screeners on the job. Since the TIP to bag
ratio is relatively low (i.e. the number of projections per passenger bags) and the resulting
TIP images (X-ray image of real passenger bag plus FTI) vary substantially with regard to
image based factors, it is difficult to obtain reliable individual performance measurements.
With a reliable statistical model for image difficulty estimation using image measurements,
corrected individual performance scores could be calculated, which would allow more reli-
able individual performance assessments. A second application is adaptive computer based
training. For example, the individually adaptive algorithms of X-Ray Tutor start with easy
views of threat items shown in bags of low Complexity with little Superposition by other
objects. Once a threat item is recognized by a screener, the View Difficulty is increased
and it is shown in more complex bags with more Superposition (for details on X-Ray Tutor
see (Schwaninger, 2004b)). There are large differences between individuals regarding their
ability to cope with image-based factors (Schwaninger, Hardmeier, & Hofer, 2005). There-
fore, a good model for image difficulty estimation using automated image measurements of
image-based factors could be very useful for enhancing such individually adaptive training
algorithms.
The study is sectioned into four experiments. The first experiment is a replication of earlier
findings (Schwaninger, Hardmeier, & Hofer, 2005) to confirm the relevance of image based
factors in predicting human performance and to show their relative inter-independence. The
second experiment aims to estimate the subjective perceptual plausibility of the underly-
ing image based factors by correlating them with the average hit rate (p(hit)), i.e. percent
detection per image averaged across participants. Threat images were rated for View Dif-
ficulty, Superposition, Clutter, Transparency and general difficulty. Images of harmless
bags were rated for Clutter, Transparency, and general difficulty. The correlation between
these ratings and human detection performance reflects the relative importance of each
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image based factor. We then developed statistical formulae and automated image mea-
surements for the above mentioned image based factors. Experiment 3 was designed to
estimate the perceptual plausibility of these computer generated estimates. We correlated
the computer-based estimates with the corresponding human ratings to determine whether
our computer-based algorithms correspond with human perception. Finally, in Experiment
4 we compared a model using computer-based estimates to a model based on human ratings
of the image based factors.
2.3 Experiment 1
2.3.1 Method
Experiment 1 is a replication of the study by Schwaninger, Hardmeier, and Hofer (2005),
who identified image based factors for threat item detection in X-ray image screening. Two
important differences need to be mentioned. In view of possible applications in TIP sys-
tems, we are mainly interested in predicting the percentage of correct responses to images
containing a threat item. Therefore, we use the hit rate instead of d′ as the variable to be pre-
dicted. In our previous studies, we used the signal detection measure d′ = z(H)− z(FA)
whereas z(H) refers to the z-transformed hit rate and z(FA) to the z-transformed false
alarm rate (Green & Swets, 1966). Secondly, only novices and no experts are tested be-
cause we want to examine image based factors independent of expertise.
Participants
Twelve undergraduate students in psychology from the University of Zurich participated
in this experiment (5 females). None of them has had any previous experience with visual
inspection of X-ray images.
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Materials
The X-Ray Object Recognition Test (X-Ray ORT) was used to measure detection perfor-
mance. This test has been designed to analyze the influence of image based effects View
Difficulty, Superposition and Bag Complexity on human detection performance when visu-
ally inspecting X-ray images of passenger bags. Inspired by signal detection theory (Green
& Swets, 1966), the X-Ray ORT consists of two sets of 128 X-ray images. One set contains
harmless bags without a threat item (N-trials, for noise). The other set contains the same
bags, each of them with a threat (SN-trials, for signal-plus-noise). Only guns and knives
of typical familiar shapes are used. This is important because the X-Ray ORT is designed
to measure cognitive visual abilities to cope with effects of View Difficulty, Superposition,
and Bag Complexity independent of specific visual knowledge about threat objects. The
X-Ray ORT consists of 256 items (X-ray images) given by the following test design: 16
threat item exemplars (8 guns, 8 knives) x 2 View Difficulty levels x 2 Bag Complexity
levels x 2 Superposition levels x 2 trial types (SN and N-trials). The construction of the
items in all image based factor combinations as shown above was lead by visual plausibility
criteria. After choosing two sets of X-ray images of harmless bags with different param-
eter values in Bag Complexity, the sixteen fictional threat items were projected into the
bags in two different view difficulties at two locations with different Superposition each.
The term fictional threat items (FTIs) is commonly used in connection with TIP systems as
discussed in the introduction. For further details on the X-Ray ORT see (Hardmeier, Hofer,
& Schwaninger, 2005; Schwaninger, Hardmeier, & Hofer, 2005). Stimuli were displayed
on 17” TFT screens at a distance of about 100cm, so that the X-ray images subtended
approximately 10-12 degrees of visual angle. The computer program measured outcome
(hit, miss, false alarm, correct rejection) and the response times from image onset to final
decision button press.
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Procedure
X-ray images of passenger bags were shown for a maximum display duration of 4 seconds.
Note that at airport security controls the human operators (screeners) usually have only 3-6
seconds to inspect a passenger bag. The participant’s task was to decide whether the image
is OK (i.e. the bag contains no threat item) or NOT OK (i.e. it contains a threat item)
by clicking one of the corresponding buttons on the screen (see Figure 2.2). In addition,
participants had to judge their decision confidence using a slider control (from UNSURE
to SURE). These confidence ratings were used for another study. No feedback was given
regarding the correctness of the responses. Participants could initiate the next trial by
pressing the space bar.
Figure 2.2: Screenshot of an X-Ray ORT trial showing an X-ray image of a passenger
bag containing a gun. Response buttons and slider control are aligned at the bottom of the
screen.
Several practice trials were presented to make sure that the task was understood properly
before the test started. Immediately prior to the actual test, all guns and knives were pre-
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sented on the screen for 10 seconds, respectively. This was done to minimize any effects
of threat item knowledge. Half of the items were shown in easy view and the other half in
difficult view.
2.3.2 Results
Figure 2.3 displays the mean hit rate (M = .80) and standard deviation (SD = 0.17)
broken up by main effects of View Difficulty, Superposition, and Bag Complexity for guns
and knives. Data was first averaged across images for each participant and then across
participants to calculate mean hit rates. The analysis of false alarm rates was not part of
this study.
Figure 2.3: Results of Experiment 1. Mean hit rate for the detection of guns and knives,
broken up by main effects of View Difficulty, Superposition, and Bag Complexity. Data
was first averaged across images for each participant and then across participants to calcu-
late mean hit rate. Error bars represent the standard deviation across participants.
Our hypothesis whereby the image based factors have great influence on threat detection
performance was tested using repeated-measures ANOVA. Table 2.1 shows the effect sizes
η2, the F -statistics and the significance levels of the ANOVA main effects.
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Table 2.1: ANCOVA main effects (η2)
Guns:
View Difficulty: η2 = .89 F (1, 11) = 91.55 p < .001
Superposition: η2 = .40 F (1, 11) = 7.45 p < .05
Bag Complexity: η2 = .14 F (1, 11) = 1.76 p = .21
Knives:
View Difficulty: η2 = .84 F (1, 11) = 59.06 p < .001
Superposition: η2 = .65 F (1, 11) = 20.48 p < .001
Bag Complexity: η2 = .23 F (1, 11) = 5.60 p = .10
2.3.3 Discussion
We were able to replicate the results from Schwaninger, Hardmeier, and Hofer (2005) in-
volving professional screeners fairly well regarding the main effects of View Difficulty and
Superposition. However, unlike in earlier studies, the image based factor Bag Complexity
had no significant effect on the hit rate for both, guns and knives. The most probable reason
for this is that the threat detection performance measure used in this study was the hit rate
instead of d′. As mentioned earlier, d′ equals z(H)− z(FA) whereas z(H) refers to the z-
transformed hit rate and z(FA) to the the z-transformed false alarm rate (Green & Swets,
1966). Effects of Bag Complexity are more likely to be found on the false alarm rate. In
X-ray screening tests, the false alarm rate is based on the number of times a participant
judges a bag to be NOT OK even though there is no threat item in it. Consistent with this
view, we found clear effects of Bag Complexity on d′ in earlier studies (Hardmeier et al.,
2005; Schwaninger, Hardmeier, & Hofer, 2005). It is therefore not too surprising that we
could not find a significant effect of Bag Complexity on hit rate alone in Experiment 1.
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2.4 Experiment 2
Experiment 2 was designed to investigate the perceptual plausibility of our image measure-
ments introduced in Experiment 3.
2.4.1 Method
The same students who had participated in Experiment 1 took part in Experiment 2 one
week later. The participant’s task was to rate the difficulties of the X-Ray ORT images
regarding View Difficulty and Superposition of the threat images. In addition, Clutter,
Transparency and general item difficulty had to be rated for threat and non-threat images.
The ratings were given by mouse clicks on a 50-point scale (0 = very low to 50 = very
high). No initial position was set. Figure 2.4 shows a screenshot of an bag containing a
threat item.
2.4.2 Results
In order to estimate the relative importance of image based factors (Schwaninger, Hard-
meier, & Hofer, 2005) on human detection performance, we correlated ratings for View
Difficulty, Superposition, Clutter and Transparency (Experiment 2) with the hit rates ob-
tained in Experiment 1. Data analysis was conducted separately for guns and knives.
Figure 2.5 shows the averaged ratings across all participants and across all threat items.
The ordinate depicts the rating scores on the 50-point scale (see Figure 2.4). The black and
white bars in each image based factors category represent the low and high parameter val-
ues according to the arrangement of the X-Ray ORT test design. Over-all mean rating value
was M = 19.2 with a standard deviation of SD = 15.4. Inter-rater consistency was quite
high with an average correlation (Fisher-corrected) between subjects of r = .64 for View
18 Chapter 2: The Model - Commencements
Figure 2.4: Screenshot of a typical trial of Experiment 2 containing a knife. All partici-
pants were asked to judge the image based factors subjectively, whereby Bag Complexity
is separated in Clutter and Transparency. Additionally, participants were asked to judge the
general item difficulty as well (not analyzed in this study). Threat items were displayed next
to the bag. For non-threat items, the slider controls for View Difficulty and Superposition
were discarded.
Difficulty, r = .62 for Superposition, r = .65 for Clutter and r = .40 for Transparency.
Correlations of ratings of image based factors with hit rate per image averaged across the
participants of Experiment 1. Table 2.2 shows the correlations between the human ratings
of the image based factors and the hit rates from Experiment 1. Image based factors and
hit rates were averaged across participants.
Concerning the mathematical signs, note that the hit rate points in the opposite direction of
threat detection difficulty. The more difficult a threat item is to be detected the lower the
hit rate.
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Figure 2.5: Results from Experiment 2 for guns and knives separately. The image based
factor Bag Complexity from the X-Ray ORT is split into the sub-factors Clutter and Trans-
parency according to the rating experiment design shown in Figure 2.4. Please note that
the factor Transparency points in the opposite direction compared to Bag Complexity and
the other image based factors.
2.4.3 Discussion
All subjective human ratings show significant correlations with the hit rates from Experi-
ment 1, except for Clutter in X-ray images containing a knife, which was marginally not
significant (p = .06). Thus, the results from Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 showed
that image based factors affect objective X-ray image difficulty (hit rate) and the image-
based factors can be rated by novices. Consistent with the findings from Experiment 1,
the ratings of image based factors show that Clutter and Transparency are less predictive
than ratings of View Difficulty and Superposition. For the development of image mea-
surements, it was necessary to split up the factor Bag Complexity into Clutter and Trans-
parency. However, this seems to be problematic, because for subjective ratings they seem
to be highly interdependent. The ratings of Clutter and Transparency are highly correlated:
r(12) = −.93, p < .001 for guns and r(12) = −.86, p < .001 for knives. We return to this
issue in Discussion section.
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Table 2.2: Correlations between image based factors and p(hit)
Guns:
View Difficulty: r(12) = −.56 p < .001
Superposition: r(12) = −.69 p < .001
Clutter: r(12) = −.32 p < .05
Transparency: r(12) = .37 p < .01
Knives:
View Difficulty: r(12) = −.53 p < .001
Superposition: r(12) = −.67 p < .001
Clutter: r(12) = −.24 p = .06
Transparency: r(12) = .31 p < .05
2.5 Experiment 3
The aim of Experiment 3 was to develop computer-based algorithms to automatically es-
timate the image based factors View Difficulty, Superposition, Clutter, and Transparency.
The perceptual plausibility of these computer-based algorithms was examined by correlat-
ing them with the human ratings obtained in Experiment 2.
2.5.1 Method
All image measurements developed for this purpose are based on theoretical considerations.
Different algorithm parameters were optimized by maximizing the correlations between the
image-based factors estimates and detection performance measures derived from earlier X-
Ray ORT findings from X-ray screening experts.
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Statistical estimates and image measurements for image based factors
View Difficulty
Even with the aid of 3D volumetric models, it is not (yet) possible to satisfyingly determine
the degree of a 3-dimensional rotation (View Difficulty) of a physical threat item automat-
ically from its 2-dimensional X-ray image (Mahfouz, Hoff, Komistek, & Dennis, 2005).
Additional difficulties regarding image segmentation arise from the very heterogeneous
backgrounds of X-ray images, compare (Sluser & Paranjape, 1999). Therefore, this image
based factor is not (yet) being calculated by image processing, but statistically from X-Ray
ORT detection performance data obtained in Experiment 1.
V Dj =
(
4∑
i=1
HitRi
)
− HitRj
3
(2.1)
Equation 2.1 shows the calculation of the image based factor View Difficulty, whereas i is
the summation index ranging from 1 to 4 (2 bag complexities x 2 Superpositions), j denotes
the index number of the X-ray image in question (one threat exemplar in one of the two
views), HitRj is its average hit rate across all participants and ’4’ is the number of the bags
each FTI was projected into. In order to avoid a circular argument in the statistical model
(multiple linear regression, see Experiment 4) by partial inclusion of the criterion variable
into a predictor, the hit rate of the one item in question is excluded from this estimate.
It is important to understand that this concept of View Difficulty is not just reflecting the
degree of rotation of an object. In that case there would be two parameter values for all
threat exemplars only. View difficulty as it is conceptualized here reflects innate View
Difficulty attributes unique to each exemplar view separately.
Superposition
This image based factor refers to how much the pixel intensities at the location of the FTI
22 Chapter 2: The Model - Commencements
in the threat bag image differ from the pixel intensities at the same location in the same bag
without the FTI. Equation 2.2 shows the image measurement formula for Superposition.
ISN(x, y) denotes the pixel intensities of a threat image and IN(x, y) denotes the pixel
intensities of the corresponding harmless bag.
SP =
√∑
x,y
(
ISN(x, y)− IN(x, y)
)2 (2.2)
It should be noted that this mathematical definition of Superposition is dependent on the
size of the threat item in the bag. For further development of the computational model it
is conceivable to split up Superposition and the size of the threat item into two separate
image based factors. Measurement of Superposition would require having both the bag
with the FTI and without. For both applications mentioned in the introduction, this is
possible with current TIP and CBT technology. In TIP, the FTI, its location, the bag with
and without the FTI are recorded. In state-of-the-art computer-based training systems, the
same information is recorded and stored, too.
Clutter
This image based factor is designed to express bag item properties like its textural unsteadi-
ness, disarrangement, chaos or just Clutter. In terms of the bag images presented, this factor
is closely related to the amount of items in the bag as well as to their structures in terms of
complexity and fineness. The method used in this study is based on the assumption, that
such texture unsteadiness can be described mathematically in terms of the amount of high
frequency regions.
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CL =
∑
x,y
Ihp(x, y) (2.3)
where Ihp(x, y) = IN ∗ F−1(hp(fx, fy))
and hp(fx, fy) = 1− 1
1 +
(√
f2x+f
2
y
f
)d
Equation 2.3 shows the image measurement formula for Clutter. It represents a convolution
of the empty bag image (N for noise) with the convolution kernel derived from a high-pass
filter in the Fourier space. IN denotes the pixel intensities of the harmless bag image. F−1
denotes the inverse Fourier transformation. hp(fx, fy) represents a high-pass filter in the
Fourier space (see Appendix A).
Transparency
The image based factor Transparency reflects the extent to which X-rays are able to pen-
etrate objects in a bag. This depends on the specific material densities of these objects.
These attributes are represented in X-ray images as different degrees of luminosity. Heavy
metallic materials such as lead are known to be very hard to be penetrated by X-rays and
therefore appear as dark areas on the X-ray images.
TR =
∑
x,y(IN(x, y) < threshold)∑
x,y(IN(x, y) < 255)
(2.4)
Equation 2.4 shows the image measurement formula for Transparency. IN(x, y) denotes
the pixel intensities of the harmless bag. threshold is the pixel intensity threshold beneath
which the pixels are counted. The implementation of the image measurement for the image
based factor Transparency is simply achieved by counting the number of pixels being darker
than a certain threshold (e.g. < 65) relative to the bag’s overall size ( < 255, non-white
pixels).
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2.5.2 Results
To examine perceptual plausibility of the computer-based measurements, we correlated
them with the corresponding averaged ratings from Experiment 2. Table 2.3 shows the
Pearson’s product-moment correlations between the calculated measurements and the cor-
responding human ratings’ mean values for each image based factor and threat category
separately.
Table 2.3: Correlations between image based factors and human ratings
Guns:
View Difficulty: r(12) = −.62 p < .001
Superposition: r(12) = −.54 p < .001
Clutter: r(12) = .16 p = .20
Transparency: r(12) = −.69 p < .001
Knives:
View Difficulty: r(12) = −.47 p < .001
Superposition: r(12) = −.44 p < .001
Clutter: r(12) = .18 p = .16
Transparency: r(12) = −.63 p < .001
2.5.3 Discussion
Except for Clutter all correlations between automated measurements and ratings are highly
significant. In the discussion of Experiment 2 the high inter-correlations between the hu-
man ratings of the image based factors Clutter and Transparency was mentioned (r(12) =
−.93, p < .001 for guns and r(12) = −.86, p < .001 for knives). Consistent with this
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result, there were also fairly high inter-correlations between the corresponding calculated
estimates of the image based factors Clutter and Transparency (r(64) = .52, p < .001 for
guns and r(64) = .55, p < .001 for knives). Except for Clutter, we can conclude that
our algorithms for automated estimation of image based factors are perceptually plausible
because they correlate significantly with the ratings of novices.
2.6 Experiment 4
Experiment 4 was designed to evaluate the predictive power of a statistical model based on
automated estimation of image based factors. To this end, we now compare the results of
multiple linear regression analysis using the automated estimates of image based factors as
predictors with the results of multiple linear regression analysis using the human ratings of
image based factors as predictors.
2.6.1 Method
The comparison included the four image based factors introduced in Experiment 3.
Multiple Linear Regression Analysis
The predictors of the multiple linear regression model are our image based factors; the hit
rates per image averaged across participants (Experiment 1) is the dependent variable. We
compared the two statistical models in terms of their goodness-of-fit measures, their regres-
sion coefficient’s significances and the percentage of variance in the dependent variable hit
rate the model is able to explain by its predictors.
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Figure 2.6: The four scatter plots from the models predicting the hit rate on the basis of
all disposable image based factors as predictors. Guns and knives are displayed separately
(columns). The models based on the calculated predictors derived from image measure-
ments are displayed in the first row and the models based on rated image based factors
predictors are displayed in the second row.
2.6.2 Results
Figure 2.6 shows the scatter plots with regression standardized predicted values on the
abscissa and the actually measured hit rate from Experiment 1 on the ordinate.
Table 2.4 shows the most important statistical values of the four multiple linear regression
analyses arranged in columns and rows like in Figure 2.6. The single tables show the four
predictors in the rows. The first column gives the variable names of the image based fac-
tors. Standardized regression weights for guns are given in the second column and the third
column shows the p-value statistics indicating the significance of the single regression co-
efficients in the model. This recurs in columns four and five for knives. For both models,
based image measurements and human ratings, also the model summaries for guns and
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knives are given. R2 tells us to which extent the model is able to predict the variance in the
hit rate. Because R2 increases with the number of predictors independently of their predic-
tive power, R2(adj) taking into account the number of predictors, is given too. Finally the
statistical indices F -value and the significance level of the model as a whole (p-value) are
given.
All statistical models are highly significant in the overall goodness-of-fit verification statis-
tics, both for guns and knives. TheR2-values, the extent to which a model is able to explain
the variance in the dependent variable by its predictors, are very high compared to values
usually obtained when predicting human performance. The model based on our image mea-
surements achieves an R2 of .61 (R2(adj)=.58) with guns and an R2 of .54 (R2(adj)=.51)
with knives. The ratings model is even marginally better with an R2 of .62 (R2(adj)=.60)
with guns and an R2 of .55 (R2(adj)=.52) with knives. Concerning the regression coef-
ficients in detail, the predictors View Difficulty and Superposition are always significant,
mostly highly significant. This is not the case for the two sub-factors of Bag Complexity
(Clutter and Transparency).
2.6.3 Discussion
The different statistical models in Experiment 4 show that the image based factors sug-
gested by Schwaninger, Hardmeier, and Hofer (2005) are quite powerful predictors of hu-
man detection performance. The model based on automated estimation of image-based
factors is as predictive as human ratings. Admittedly, Experiment 4 shows also that the
sub-factors of the image based factor Bag Complexity, Clutter and Transparency, do not
contribute significantly to the explanatory power of the model. In some cases, they even
show regression weights which point in the opposite direction of what is expected. As
already mentioned in Experiments 1 and 2 this can be explained by the fact that in de-
tection experiments Bag Complexity rather affects the false alarm rate than the hit rate.
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Model Summaries (Per Category)
Guns Knives
β -weights p-values β -weights p-values
Im
ag
e
M
ea
su
re
m
en
ts
View Difficulty .61 .000 .29 .018
Superposition .33 .000 .50 .000
Clutter .11 .239 -.15 .194
Transparency -.18 .072 -.03 .788
R2 .61 .54
R2(adj) .58 .51
F (4, 59) 23 17
p .000 .000
H
um
an
R
at
in
gs
View Difficulty -.39 .000 -.33 .001
Superposition -.60 .000 -.68 .000
Clutter .36 .227 -.13 .497
Transparency .27 .107 -.34 .123
R2 .62 .55
R2(adj) .60 .52
F (4, 59) 24 18
p .000 .000
Table 2.4: Statistical analysis tables of the models with the most important statistical val-
ues of the multiple linear regression analyses. Each of the four tables shows the statistical
values of the verification of each regression coefficient separately in the rows. Addition-
ally the model’s overall goodness-of-fit verification values are given in the bottom row of
each model. In both statistical models, the dependent variable is the hit rate obtained in
Experiment 1.
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This is currently being investigated in additional experiments. Nevertheless, our compu-
tational model is able to predict the hit rate in terms of image based factors as good as
human ratings can. Such a model could therefore provide a basis for the enhancement of
individually adaptive computer-based testing and training systems in which the estimation
of X-ray image difficulty is an essential component. In addition, the image measurements
developed in this study can be very useful for analyzing more reliable individual TIP per-
formance scores by taking into account image difficulty as explained in the introduction. It
is interesting to discuss the differences in the beta-weights between guns and knives in the
image processing model. For guns View Difficulty is weighted almost double compared
to Superposition. For knives, where Superposition is weighted almost double compared to
View Difficulty, the contrary pattern was observed. We are currently conducting additional
analyses to find out whether this effect is related to differential changes by 3D rotation. The
reason why Superposition is weighted much stronger in knives than in guns is probably due
to the Superposition formula which also reflects the size of the threat items. In the X-Ray
ORT knives differ more in size than guns. Thus, the regression coefficient patterns reflect
actual characteristics of the weapon categories. The scatter plots (Figure 2.6) reveal that,
especially in knives, there is a certain ceiling effect. Therefore, it might be of value to use
non-linear regression for modeling hit rates in the future. Apart from that, this study can be
viewed as the basis for further statistical models for the prediction of individual screener re-
sponses to single X-ray images using binary logistic regression. In addition, together with
the development of enhanced and additional image based predictors we intend to develop
parallel statistical models to predict hit rates as well as false alarm rates.
Chapter 3
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3.1 On How Image Based Factors and Human Factors
Contribute to Threat Detection Performance in X-Ray
Aviation Security Screening
Schwaninger, Michel, and Bolfing (2007) contributed an article on X-ray image difficulty
estimation based on a set of image based factors. The study revealed that it is possible to
predict average detection performance (across a sample of participants) on a single image
quite well solely based on computationally accessible image properties. The image based
factors used in that model were View Difficulty, Superposition, Clutter and Transparency.
All image based factors can be automatically calculated. Multiple linear regression was
used for statistical modeling. A comparison between the model based on automatically
computed predictors (image based factors) and the same model based on human ratings (of
the image based factors) revealed that our image measurements and statistics can predict
30
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human performance as well as human raters can. The study was based on a participants
sample of 12 undergraduate students and on a X-ray object recognition test consisting of
256 images.
The study reported in the following is an extensive amplification of the Schwaninger,
Michel, and Bolfing (2007) article. We were able to replicate the results of the earlier study
with professional screeners and additional extensions in terms of data set size, additional
factors and additional statistical analyses. The new test consists of 2048 test items and
results are based on a participants sample of 90 screeners. Furthermore, three additional
factors have been included: Human factors, namely Training and Age as well as the image
based factor Bag Size. The number of threat categories was doubled by adding improvised
explosive devices (IEDs) and ’other’ to guns and knives.
Since detection performance in visual search tasks depends on the stimulus material (image
based factors) but also on human factors, human factors should not be neglected in a com-
prehensive model. This allows comparing the impact of image based factors and human
factors. The image based factors included are Threat Category, View Difficulty, Super-
position, Opacity, Clutter, and finally Bag Size as a new factor. Starting with a summary
of bivariate correlations between all factors and detection performance d′ we give a first
impression of the relationship between the predictors and detection performance. Subse-
quently two multiple linear regression analyses with image based factors and human factors
as predictors are presented. These models allow an estimation of the total amount of vari-
ance in d′ explained by the image based factors and human factors, respectively. Finally,
an analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) is reported to reveal interactions between the factors.
It allows estimating the main effects as well as their interactions.
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3.2 Introduction
Together with the tremendous growth of civil aviation the importance of aviation security
and its public perception has dramatically increased in the last few decades (“Annual Re-
view of Civil Aviation 2005”, 2006). The security checkpoints at the gates for X-raying
passenger bags are the key element in aviation security all over the world. Despite great im-
provements in technical equipment, including high resolution X-ray machines, the decision
whether a piece of luggage can enter an airplane or not is still made by human screeners.
Therefore aviation security officers and their activity in screening passenger bags are a crit-
ical link of utmost importance in aviation security. In this study we analyze the effects
on detection performance of prohibited items in passenger bags of two different groups of
factors: ’Human factors’ and ’image based factors’. The concept of image based factors
subsumes all properties of the passenger bags’ X-ray images that are relevant in mediat-
ing performance in detecting prohibited items. The concept of human factors subsumes
available properties of the persons performing the screening task relevant in mediating
threat detection performance. The aim of the reported study in this article is to investigate
the role of image based and human factors on the threat detection performance in pas-
senger bag screening tasks. For this purpose the effects of the different factors on threat
detection performance, as well as their interactions will be assessed as comprehensively as
possible. Previous work (Schwaninger, 2003b; Schwaninger, Hardmeier, & Hofer, 2005;
Schwaninger, Michel, & Bolfing, 2007) has identified the following performance relevant
image based factors: Threat Object View Difficulty, Superposition by other objects and
Bag Complexity (represented in the following by Opacity and Clutter). The experiment
is based on an off-line computer based test consisting of 2048 trials. The test is designed
with the four image based factors View Difficulty, Superposition, Bag Complexity and Bag
Size systematically varied in order to avoid confounded variables. This design allows anal-
ysis of individual and combined effects of the image based factors, as well as analysis of
their interactions. Furthermore we will analyze data of the human factors Training and
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Age (Riegelnig & Schwaninger, 2006). Training was operationalized as the amount of
hours spent on training using the ’X-Ray Tutor’ computer based training system prior to
testing.
3.2.1 Image Based Factors
Schwaninger (2003b) and Schwaninger, Hardmeier, and Hofer (2005) have identified three
image based factors which affect human threat detection performance significantly: View
Difficulty, Superposition, and Bag Complexity. These image based factors have been
modeled into mathematical formulae (Schwaninger, Michel, & Bolfing, 2007; Bolfing &
Schwaninger, 2007). View Difficulty is implemented as an a posteriori calculable value
named FTI View Difficulty. The abbreviation FTI represents fictional threat item, X-ray
images of threat objects being artificially projected into X-ray images of passenger bags.
Superposition and Bag Complexity are implemented as image processing measurements
whereby Bag Complexity is split up into Clutter and Opacity. The introduction of the image
based factor Bag Size in this study necessitated normalization of earlier implementations
of Clutter and Opacity regarding bag size.
Figure 3.1: Image based factors
34 Chapter 3: Model Consolidation I - Getting to the Bottom
FTI View Difficulty
The general formula for FTI View Difficulty can be seen in Equation 3.1. It is a slight mod-
ification of the mean of the inverted detection performance value (DetPerf) over all items
(index NOV ) containing the same FTI object (subindex O) in the same view (subindex V )
as the item in question. ’Inverted’ refers to the fact that the measured detection perfor-
mance is subtracted from a theoretical maximum detection performance (max(DetPerf)),
in order to ensure that high values of FTI View Difficulty correspond with high difficulties.
The slight modification refers to the exclusion of the item in question from averaging.
FtiVDOV j =
NOV∑
i=1,j 6=i
(max(DetPerf)− DetPerfOV i)
NOV − 1 (3.1)
Superposition
Superposition is modeled as the inverted Euclidean distance in pixel intensity between an
SN image (signal plus noise; image containing a threat item) and its corresponding N image
(noise; non-threat image).
SP = C −
√∑
x,y
(
ISN(x, y)− IN(x, y)
)2 (3.2)
Please note that in all reported analyses we used logarithmically transformed Superposition
values. After inspecting the scatterplots of all our factors with the detection performance
d′ in order to check for non-linear relationships (a violation of the requirements of multiple
linear regressions) we decided to linearize Superposition by this log-transform. This way
heteroscedasticity (another violation of the requirements of MLR) can be avoided and the
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explained variance of the relationship between the factor and detection performance can be
increased.
Clutter
Clutter is designed to capture bag image properties like disarrangement, textural noise,
chaos or just plain clutter. We modeled the Clutter variable based on the assumption
that image properties like the ones mentioned above correspond with larger amounts of
high spatial frequencies in the image. Equation 3.3 represents a convolution of the empty
bag image (N for noise) with the convolution kernel derived from a high-pass filter in the
Fourier space. IN denotes the pixel intensities of the harmless bag image. F−1 denotes the
inverse Fourier transformation. hp(fx, fy) represents a high-pass filter in the Fourier space.
BS represents Bag Size (see Equation 3.5). Cut-off frequency f and transition d (the filter’s
order) were set to f = 0.03 and d = 11. The pixel summation on the high-pass filtered
image was restricted to the bag’s area.
CL =
∑
x,y Ihp(x, y)
BS
(3.3)
where Ihp(x, y) = IN ∗ F−1(hp(fx, fy))
= F−1(F(IN · hp(fx, fy))
and hp(fx, fy) = 1− 1
1 +
(√
f2x+f
2
y
f
)d
Opacity
Opacity represents how well X-rays are able to penetrate an object. High Opacity values
represent low penetrability. In X-ray images this property is represented by pixel color and
36 Chapter 3: Model Consolidation I - Getting to the Bottom
brightness. Opacity represents the total size of areas with pixels being darker than a certain
threshold relative to the bag’s size. In Equation 3.4 all pixels being darker than a certain
threshold (e.g. 64) are summed up and divided by the bag’s size (Bag Size as denominator).
OP =
∑
x,y
(
IN(x, y) < 64
)
BS
(3.4)
Bag Size
The Bag Size formula below is applicable to grayscale images with pixel brightness values
ranging from 0 (black) to 255 (white). All pixels with brightness values lower than 254
(almost white) are considered as part of the bag. Bag Size is then defined as the size of the
bag in number of pixels
BS =
∑
x,y
(IN(x, y) < 254) (3.5)
3.3 Methods and Procedures
3.3.1 Participants
The participants sample consists of 90 professional aviation security X-ray screening offi-
cers from two European airports (48 females). On average females are 40.6 and males 35.9
years old with standard deviations of 17.8 and 13.6 years respectively.
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3.3.2 Stimuli
The 2048 test stimuli were created automatically using the image measurement algorithms
described above. The number of trial images is determined by the following test design:
The test consists of eight threat exemplar pairs per threat category. Given the categories
Guns, Knives, IEDs and Other this results in 64 different exemplars of threat items. Each
of these threat items is presented with each possible factor combination. Each of the im-
age based factors introduced above is implemented in the design with two dichotomous
parameter values representing low and high values. For View Difficulty, Superposition,
Bag Complexity and Bag Size this results in 2x2x2x2= 16 factor combinations. The 64
threat exemplars in 16 factor combinations result in 1024 images. In order to apply signal
detection theory (Green & Swets, 1966) in the analysis all 1024 bag images containing
fictional threat items (FTIs) are also presented in the test not containing any threat items.
This results in the total of 2048 images.
The construction process of the test stimuli was partly manual and partly automated. In
a first step the 64 threat exemplars were chosen manually such that the diversity of threat
items in each of the four categories is well represented. In a second step a set of 1024 bag
images was chosen based on the image measurements introduced above. In total 6659 bag
images were analyzed regarding Clutter, Opacity and Bag Size. Subsequently we deter-
mined the membership of each image regarding high or low parameter values by applying
median splits on each of the three image based factor distributions Opacity, Clutter and Bag
Size. Opacity and Clutter are very highly intercorrelated. Thus it did not make sense to
define and vary high and low parameter values for Opacity and Clutter independently. In-
stead the dichotomous variable Bag Complexity was defined based on Opacity and Clutter:
For Bag Complexity high and low parameter values were defined as bags with both high or
low Opacity and Clutter values, respectively. Bags with high Opacity and low Clutter val-
ues or vice versa were discarded. For each of the resulting factor combinations - low/high
Bag Complexity x small/large Bag Size - 256 images were chosen manually. In the last
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step fictional threat items were automatically merged with the harmless bags. Each of the
64 threat exemplars exists in two different views. The easy views were depicted in frontal
view and the difficult ones were depicted in a 85◦ rotation relative to the frontal view, either
horizontally or vertically. This results in a total of 128 fictional threat items (FTIs). Each of
these 128 FTIs was finally merged with the 256 harmless bags with two different levels of
Superposition - low and high. This procedure was applied four times for each combination
of harmless bags. As already mentioned, this process was fully automatic. The underlying
merging algorithm merges the images and calculates the Superposition value. If the Super-
position value lies in the low or high superposition level range it is being saved as such. If
not, the process is repeated until the FTI can be merged within the desired superposition
value range.
3.3.3 Procedure
Since the test contains a very large amount of items participants completed it over multi-
ple sessions. The test presentation was implemented within the computer based training
system X-Ray Tutor 2.0 which can be run as a testing and a training environment. X-Ray
Tutor is a well-established training tool designed to effectively improve and reliably test X-
ray image interpretation competency. Customer airports are recommended to advise their
security screeners to practice at least 20 minutes per week using X-Ray Tutor. The current
test was inserted into the familiar training sequences and continued after each login until
completion. After that, normal training continued. The shared basis of training and testing
allows extracting training data of each screener prior to testing.
The 2048 images are presented in random order. The participants’ task is to decide whether
a piece of luggage would be OK or not OK to hypothetically enter an airplane by pressing
buttons OK or NOT OK with a computer mouse. Unlike in training mode, in testing mode
participants receive no feedback with regards to the correctness of their answers. Data are
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recorded in a database.
3.3.4 Statistics
The data are analyzed in three ways. First we present all bivariate correlations between the
independent variables (image based factors and human factors) and detection performance
d′. This gives a good estimation of how well detection performance can be predicted on the
basis of our predictors. The second statistics we present are two separate linear regression
models, one for image based factors and one for human factors, respectively. Regression
analyses allow estimating the combined impact of the respective predictors together. Re-
gression analyses allow estimating to what extent a certain set of predictors is able to predict
the measured values (Coolican, 2004), in this case the measured detection performance d′.
The regression analysis using the image based factors as predictors is a replication and re-
finement of an earlier study by Schwaninger, Michel, and Bolfing (2007) which was based
on the X-Ray ORT (Hardmeier, Hofer, & Schwaninger, 2006b). The present analysis is
based on a much larger item- and subject sample since we used a new test for the present
study. The most notable differences between the X-Ray ORT and this test are the inclusion
of the new image based factor Bag Size and the extension of the threat item categories by
IEDs (Improvised Explosive Devices) and ”Other”. Since linear regression analyses do
not take into account any kind of interaction effects between the predictors we report a
third type of analysis. The analysis of covariance (ANCOVA), with our image based fac-
tors operationalized as repeated measures variables and the human factors as covariates.
It is important to be aware of potential interaction effects, since the presence of large in-
teractions would limit the amount of variance explained by the multiple linear regression
models.
40 Chapter 3: Model Consolidation I - Getting to the Bottom
3.4 Results
In conformity with the Statistics section the results are reported in the following order: First
we report the findings of the bivariate and partial correlations. In a second step we report
the results of the multiple linear regression analyses per threat item category as well as for
all categories combined. One set of multiple linear regression analyses will be based on
image based factors and the other on human factors. Finally we report the ANCOVA with
the image based factors as repeated measures and with the human factors Age and Training
as covariates.
3.4.1 Bivariate Correlations
Figure 3.2 shows the bivariate correlations with d′ of each image based factor and the
partial correlations with d′ of each human factor - with the respective other human factor
serving as a control variable. The reason why we decided to treat image based factors and
human factors differently is the following: The image based factors have been implemented
within the computer based test in order to obtain orthogonal relationships between them.
In other words, image based factor values vary independently across test items. Since we
could not ensure independence of the human factors Age and Training through test design
or sample selection, orthogonal relationships between human factors cannot be assumed.
The data reveal that indeed Age and Training are confounded, with people tending to train
more the older they are. Therefore we decided to additionally report partial correlations to
avoid false conclusions regarding the effects of Age and Training on visual search tasks.
Furthermore we decided to graphically report R2 values instead of plain Rs. The great
advantage of R2 over R is that it can be directly interpreted as the amount of variance
in the dependent variables (d′) that can be explained by the independent variable (single
factors). The disadvantage is the loss of information on the sign of the relationship due to
squaring.
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Figure 3.2: The bivariate R2 values for the image based factors and the partial R2 values
for the human factors are estimates for the amount of variance in detection performance d′
that can be explained by the single factors.
Figure 3.2 illustrates the relationship of the individual factors on detection performance d′
by threat category for image based factors and human factors separately. The graphs clearly
reveal that three factors explain a substantially higher amount of variance than all the others,
i. e. FTI View Difficulty, Superposition (log-transformed) and Training (log-transformed
training hours). Age also shows a notable effect which is much smaller, but remains stable
across all threat categories. Exact values are reported in Table 3.1. A detailed discussion
on the data patterns is given in the Discussions section at the end of this article.
3.4.2 Multiple Linear Regression Analysis
Figures 3.3 - 3.5 all show scatterplots illustrating the statistical relationship between the
observed (empirically measured) detection performance values d′ (ordinate) and the stan-
dardized predicted values estimated by the respective multiple linear regression models
(abscissa). For each model R2 and R values are displayed in the bottom right corner of the
scatterplot as a measure for the closeness of the relationship between model prediction and
empirical measurements.
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Image based factors Human factors
bivariate correlations partial correlations bivariate correlations
with d′ with d′ with d′
FTI-VD logSP OP CL BS logTR Age logTR Age
Guns -.74 -.57 -.16 -.06 -.02 .77 -.34 .75 .19
Knives -.76 -.49 -.29 -.09 -.17 .76 -.36 .73 .16
IEDs -.36 -.38 -.30 -.02 -.05 .84 -.31 .84 .28
Other -.85 -.68 -.18 -.05 -.05 .79 -.31 .78 .24
Table 3.1: Tabulation of the correlations between the single factors (human and image
based) and the detection performance measure d’ separately for each threat category. For
human factors, also partial correlations are given, the respective other human factor taken
as the control variable.
Category independent models
Figure 3.3 shows the scatterplots of the multiple linear regression models for the image
based factors and human factors respectively. Differences concerning threat categories are
not taken into account here. Both models can explain nearly 70% of the observed variance
in d′. In the image based factors model 1024 data points are estimated. Each data point
represents one signal-noise/noise item pair with its hit rate and false alarm across all 90
screeners. In the human factors model there are only 90 data points because d′ values are
calculated per subject across all 1024 item pairs.
Table 3.2 shows the most important statistical values of the multiple linear regression anal-
yses for both models.
Models by category
Figures 3.4 and 3.5 show the corresponding linear regression model scatterplots to Fig-
ure 3.3 but separately for each threat category. This allows us to compare the relationship
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Figure 3.3: General regression models across all threat item categories. Scatterplots with
standardized predicted values of the image based and human factors multiple linear regres-
sion models on the x-axis and observed detection performance d′ on the y-axis.
between image based factors and threat detection performance with the relationship be-
tween human factors and threat detection performance separately for each threat category.
Table 3.3 shows the most important statistical values for each of the reported models.
Image based factors
Figure 3.4 shows the four scatterplots illustrating the predictive power of the image based
factors regression model separately for each threat category.
Human factors
Figure 3.5 shows the four scatterplots illustrating the predictive power of the human factors
regression model separately for each threat category.
3.4.3 ANCOVA
Figure 3.6 shows a short overview of the ANCOVA results. The ANCOVA allows us to
integrate human factors as covariates into a repeated measures ANOVA of image based
factors (including threat category) and thus allows us to explore interaction effects and
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Model Summaries (All Categories)
Predictors Beta weights Significance
β p
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FTI View Difficulty −.70 .000
logSuperposition −.127 .000
Opacity −.329 .000
Clutter .198 .000
Bag Size .021 .288
R2 = .68, adjusted R2 = .68, F (5, 1018) = 441, p < .000
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s
logTrainingHours .93 .000
Age −.26 .000
R2 = .69, adjusted R2 = .68, F (2, 87) = 98, p < .000
Table 3.2: Tabular summary of the general multiple linear regression models for all threat
item categories. Standardized beta weights and p-values.
dependencies among not just the image based factors, but also between the image based
factors in combination with the human factors. On the left, Figure 3.6 illustrates the im-
portance of the image based factors in terms of their effect size values η2 (eta squared)
and their interactions with the human factors. The main effects of each image based factor
are reported together with their interaction effects with Training (log-transformed training
hours) and Age, respectively. On the right, Figure 3.6 additionally illustrates the ten largest
significant interactions in terms of η2 values. For details on the data, their patterns and
conclusions please consider Table 3.4 and the Discussions section at the end of this article.
Table 3.4 shows all η2 values and the significance levels of the main effects and the inter-
action effects illustrated in Figure 3.6.
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Figure 3.4: Separate image based factors regression models for each of the four threat item
categories.
3.5 Discussions
For the discussion of our findings we retain the same presentation order as we did in the
Methods and Results sections. Starting with the findings of the bivariate correlations we
continue discussing the multiple linear regression models ending with the discussion of
ANCOVA results.
3.5.1 Bivariate Correlations
The correlations between our factors and d′ can be interpreted as the observed relationships
between our predictors and d′ observations. This gives us a first impression of how much
explained variance we can expect from a single predictor. Figure 3.2 and Table 3.1 reveal
that there are close relationships between d′ and the three predictors FTI View Difficulty,
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Figure 3.5: Seperate human factors regression models for each of the four threat item
categories.
Superposition (log-transformed) and Training (log-transformed training hours). Also we
can report a notable (partial) correlation between Age and d′. The remaining three predic-
tors Opacity, Clutter and Bag Size show poor correlations. Clutter and Bag Size do not
even reach the level of statistical significance of p = .05, Bag Size in knives being the
only exception (p < .01). Table 3.1 shows both the bivariate- and partial correlations of
the human factors with d′ in order to allow direct comparisons. There are only very slight
changes between bivariate and partial correlations with Training, but note that the signs
of the correlations with Age all change from positive to negative when calculating partial
correlation. The bivariate correlations reveal that the participants improve their detection
performance with increasing Age. This finding contradicts earlier studies on visual search
tasks that revealed a deterioration of performance with Age (Madden, Gottlob, & Allen,
1999). The partial correlations put this in perspective: Participants compensated age with
more training, and indeed when controlling for Training there is a small negative correla-
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Figure 3.6: Summary of ANCOVA main effect and interaction effect sizes. All covariate
interactions and the ten largest remaining interactions are reported.
tion between Age and detection performance.
A very interesting aspect of this analysis is the comparison of the correlations’ patterns for
the different threat categories. The data reveal that different factors are important for being
able to identify FTIs belonging to different threat categories. Figure 3.2 illustrates impres-
sively how View Difficulty has a similar amount of influence on detection performance of
guns and knives, but a much smaller amount on IEDs and a notably larger one on Other.
Interpreting the pattern of Other is very difficult because Other is just the rest category for
all the threat objects that do not fit into any of the other three categories1. Thus the category
Other includes as diverse objects as throwing stars (shuriken), tasers, hand grenades or gas
tanks. Even though the IED stimulus set contains all sorts of hand made bombs, the stimuli
are still comparatively homogenous making an interpretation of the image based factors
much simpler than with Other: IEDs are generally made up of multiple essential parts (ex-
plosive material, fuse, cables, energy source, timer, etc.). Each of these has its own rotation
(View Difficulty) and its own Superposition value. Therefore it is not too surprising that
the effects of View Difficulty and Superposition are highly diminished. A very interesting
complementary finding is that while for IEDs image based factors in general show the low-
1Threat categorization was inherited from the official ECAC threat categorization. ECAC refers to Euro-
pean Civil Aviation Conference
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est impact on detection performance compared to the other threat categories, human factors
- especially Training - show the strongest effects on d′ with IEDs.
3.5.2 Multiple Linear Regression Models
As already anticipated in the Results section we are very happy to report the achieved ex-
plained variances of nearly 70% for both the image based factors regression model as well
as for the human factors regression model. The fact that we are able to explain such a
big portion of variance from two distinct sets of predictors independently makes us very
confident to get a grip on the process of X-ray threat detection tasks. We are very confi-
dent that the image based factors together with human factors constitute the key aspects to
cover for a better general understanding of the cognitive processes involved in this kind of
visual search task. Nevertheless we still see some potential to further augment our model
fits. This applies to the image based factors model as well as to the human factors model.
Particularly with regards to the implementation of Clutter we see great potential to elicit
larger predictive power - though to date we have not yet found a mathematical formula that
rendered better results than the one currently in use. As for human factors: Until now we
have merely investigated Training and Age. We see great potential in enlarging the set of
human factors. Besides the undoubtedly important factor Training we expect visual abili-
ties such as mental rotation, figure-ground segregation or visual search for highly specific
patterns to be another important factor that should not be disregarded in a comprehensive
model. Unfortunately for this study appropriate data were not available. As a standard
human factor Gender should also be taken into account in future research.
Regarding the differences in terms of the explained variances and how they are made up
of in terms of the beta weights among categories some remarkable notes must be made.
The first pattern to catch one’s eye is the different behavior of IEDs compared to the other
threat categories. In the case of IEDs the image based factors’ model regarding d′ shows a
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comparatively low amount of explained variance. For all other categories the image based
factors have a very high predictive power. A closer look at the beta weights and correla-
tions reveals that it is particularly the effect of FTI View Difficulty which lies far below
what would be expected based on the results from the other threat categories. The comple-
mentary finding is that compared to the other categories IEDs show the largest amount of
explained variance with the human factors model. The beta weights and correlations reveal
that this can overwhelmingly be attributed to Training. We can conclude that IEDs depend
largely on human factors, especially on Training. We assume that detection performance
with IEDs depends on knowledge as opposed to visual abilities to a larger extent than is
the case with the other categories. In general the human factor models show much lower
differences in predictive power among threat categories than the image based factor mod-
els do. We assume that the explanation for the comparatively large variation of the overall
predictive power of the image based models as well as the comparatively large amount of
variation between the correlations of the individual image based factors with d′ lies in de-
tection performance being based on several distinct cognitive processes dealing with the
different image based factors, with their relative importance varying between categories.
Figure 3.7: Comparison of adjusted R2 values of image based factor and human factor
linear regression models for each threat item category.
50 Chapter 3: Model Consolidation I - Getting to the Bottom
3.5.3 ANCOVA/ Interactions
There are some essential differences concerning data types. The factor View Difficulty
as it is operationalized for the ANCOVA cannot be directly compared with the variable
FTI View Difficulty used in the correlation analyses and the regression models. FTI View
Difficulty is a proportionally scaled measure derived statistically from performance data
whereas the ANCOVA factor View Difficulty is a dichotomous nominal variable differen-
tiating between easy and difficult views only. As a matter of fact, all image based factors
- except of course for the factor ’Threat Category’ - are dichotomous in the ANCOVA
(refer to the paragraph on stimuli in the Methods section). Bag Complexity replaces the
compound of Opacity and Clutter (refer to the Stimuli section).
The main effects of the ANCOVA on all categories give a similar picture as did the corre-
lations. In analogy to what we found in the correlation analyses, effects of Superposition
are larger than effects of Bag Complexity and Bag Size. Furthermore the results show that
there are considerable interactions with Training regarding the different threat categories.
For example, as discussed above the effect of Training on detection performance is clearly
larger in IEDs than in knives.
View Difficulty and Superposition also show interaction effects with Training. The im-
provement of the detection performance caused by Training is clearly larger regarding the
difficult views compared to the easy ones. The interaction between Superposition and
Training on the other hand is fairly small. This could indicate that dealing with superpo-
sition is difficult to improve with Training. For Bag Complexity and Bag Size interactions
with Training are not significant. No evidence could be provided for interaction effects of
any of our image based factors (including threat category) with Age.
In the following itemization we give a short overview of the four largest reported first order
interactions and plausible interpretations with examples.
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Model Summaries (Per Category)
Predictors Guns Knives IEDs Other
β p β p β p β p
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FTI View Difficulty −.67 .000 −.67 .000 −.29 .000 −.79 .000
logSuperposition −.12 .025 −.18 .000 −.25 .000 −.09 .061
Opacity −.27 .000 −.36 .000 −.51 .000 −.31 .000
Clutter .18 .005 .17 .003 .35 .000 .20 .000
Bag Size .04 .375 −.05 .256 .09 .105 .05 .187
R2 .60 .70 .34 .77
adjustedR2 .59 .70 .32 .77
F (5, 250) 75 117 25 169
p .000 .000 .000 .000
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logTraining .88 .000 .88 .000 .94 .000 .90 .000
Age −.26 .001 −.29 .000 −.20 .003 −.22 .004
R2 .61 .59 .73 .65
adjustedR2 .60 .58 .72 .64
F (2, 87) 69 63 118 80
p .000 .000 .000 .000
Table 3.3: Tabular summary of separate multiple linear regression models for each of the
four threat item categories. Standardized beta weights and p-values.
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ANCOVA effect sizes η2
Category View Difficulty Superposition Bag Complexity Bag Size
Main effects .33∗∗∗ .34∗∗∗ .51∗∗∗ .40∗∗∗ .04
* logTraining .31∗∗∗ .25∗∗∗ .09∗∗ .02 .00
* Age .01 .01 .00 .01 .01
Table 3.4: Summary of ANCOVA main effects and covariate interactions.
VD * Cat: reflects the fact that effects of View Difficulty differ between
Threat Categories e.g.: compare correlations of View Diffi-
culty and d′ between IEDs and Other
VD * SP: difficult views are more affected by high Superpositions that
easy ones and vice versa
BC * Cat: reflects the fact that effects of Bag Complexity differ be-
tween Threat Categories
SP * Cat: reflects the fact that effects of Superposition differ between
Threat Categories
Chapter 4
Model Consolidation II - Completing the
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4.1 A Statistical Approach for Image Difficulty Estima-
tion in X-Ray Screening Using Image Measurements
The relevance of aviation security has increased dramatically at the beginning of this cen-
tury. One of the most important tasks is the visual inspection of passenger bags using X-ray
machines. In this study, we investigated the role of image based factors on human detection
of prohibited items in X-ray images. Schwaninger et al. (2004); Schwaninger, Hardmeier,
and Hofer (2005) have identified three image based factors: View Difficulty, Superposition
and Bag Complexity. This article consists of 5 experiments which lead to the development
of a statistical model that is able to predict image difficulty based on the mentioned image
based factors. Experiment 1 is a replication of earlier findings confirming the relevance
of image based factors as defined by Schwaninger, Hardmeier, and Hofer (2005) on X-ray
detection performance. In Experiment 2, we found significant correlations between human
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ratings of image based factors and human detection performance for most of the image
based factors. In Experiment 3, we introduced our image measurements and found mostly
significant correlations between them and human detection performance. Moreover, signif-
icant correlations were found between our image measurements and corresponding human
ratings, indicating high perceptual plausibility. In Experiment 4 we contrasted the image
based factors measurements with the human ratings from Experiment 2 in terms of their
predictive power in multiple linear regression models. Experiment 5 is another replica-
tion of the image measurements part in Experiment 4, whereby the data are based on a
much more extensive test as well as on a larger sample size of professional screeners. Ap-
plications of a computational model for threat image projection systems and for adaptive
computer-based training are discussed.
4.2 Introduction
The relevance of aviation security has increased dramatically in recent years and there has
been substantial progress regarding screening technology, especially in the field of auto-
matic explosive detection systems (Ying et al., 2006). However, the last decision is always
made by a human operator and investigating human factors as essential determinants of se-
curity screening performance has become an important research topic. First contributions
in the field of X-ray image inspection were based on research in medical image interpre-
tation (Gale et al., 2000). Krupinski et al. (2003) were able to identify important factors
that influence pulmonary nodule detection. Experimental psychology studies (Ghylin et
al., 2006) and eye movement research (McCarley et al., 2004; Liu et al., 2006) have been
useful to better understand visual search and perceptual learning in X-ray image interpre-
tation. A series of studies conducted in recent years has provided converging evidence for
the importance of scientifically based selection, training and testing methods to achieve and
maintain high levels of performance in X-ray image interpretation (Schwaninger, 2005b,
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2006b).
The aim of this study is to develop and evaluate a statistical model for image difficulty esti-
mation in X-ray screening using image measurements. Schwaninger, Hardmeier, and Hofer
(2005) could show that there are three major image based factors which affect detection per-
formance: View difficulty depending on the rotation of an object, Superposition by other
objects in the bag, and Bag Complexity, which comprises Clutter, the bag’s background
texture unsteadiness, and Opacity, the relative size of dark areas in the bag. Figure 4.1 il-
lustrates the three image based factors as proposed by Schwaninger, Hardmeier, and Hofer
(2005).
Figure 4.1: Illustration of the three major image based factors suggested by Schwaninger
et al. (2004); Schwaninger, Hardmeier, and Hofer (2005).
A model for image difficulty estimation using automated image measurements and human
performance statistics can be very useful for threat image projection (TIP) data analysis and
individually adaptive computer based training (CBT) systems. TIP is a software function of
state-of-the art X-ray machines which allows automated insertion of fictional threat items
(FTIs) into X-ray images of real passenger bags. TIP systems are operational in several
countries and used to enhance motivation and attention of screeners on the job. Since the
TIP to bag ratio is relatively low (i.e. the number of projections per passenger bags) and
the resulting TIP images (X-ray image of real passenger bag plus FTI) vary substantially
with regard to image based factors, it is difficult to obtain reliable individual performance
measurements. With a reliable statistical model for image difficulty estimation using im-
age measurements, corrected individual performance scores could be calculated, which
would allow more reliable individual performance assessments. A second application is
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adaptive CBT. For example, in the computer based training program X-Ray Tutor, the in-
dividually adaptive algorithms start displaying easy views of threat items shown in bags
of low complexity with little Superposition by other objects. Once a threat item is recog-
nized by a screener, the View Difficulty is increased and it is shown in more complex bags
with more Superposition (for details on X-Ray Tutor see Schwaninger (2004b)). There
are large differences between individuals regarding their ability to cope with image-based
factors Schwaninger, Hardmeier, and Hofer (2005). Therefore, a good model for image
difficulty estimation using automated image measurements of image-based factors could
be very useful for enhancing such individually adaptive training algorithms.
The study is sectioned into five experiments. The first experiment is a replication of earlier
findings (Schwaninger, Hardmeier, & Hofer, 2005) to confirm the relevance and relative
independence of image based factors in predicting human performance. The second exper-
iment aims to estimate the subjective perceptual plausibility of the underlying image based
factors by correlating them with the average d′. Threat images were rated for View Diffi-
culty, Superposition, Clutter, Opacity and general difficulty. Images of harmless bags were
rated for Clutter, Opacity, and general difficulty only. The correlation between these rat-
ings and human detection performance reflects the relative importance of each image based
factor. We then developed statistical formulae and automated image measurements for the
above mentioned image based factors. Experiment 3 was designed to estimate the percep-
tual plausibility of these computer generated estimates. We correlated the computer-based
estimates with the corresponding human ratings to determine whether our computer-based
algorithms correspond with human perception. In Experiment 4 we compared a model
using computer-based estimates to a model based on human ratings of the image based
factors. Experiments 1 to 4 are concerted and are based on the same subjects, images and
tests. Finally, Experiment 5 provides a fairly extended replication of the calculations model
in Experiment 4. The mentioned extension in Experiment 5 refers to the inclusion of Bag
Size as an additional image based factor. Further, the data used in Experiment 5 stem from
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completely different subjects (in terms of sample size) as well as in terms of the test used
and its image stimuli. The larger data base underlying Experiment 5 results in much more
stable and clearer results than the ones achieved in Experiment 4.
4.3 Experiment 1
4.3.1 Method
Experiment 1 is a replication of the study by Schwaninger, Hardmeier, and Hofer (2005),
who identified image based factors for threat item detection in X-ray image screening. In
all of the following experiments the dependent variable used is the signal detection measure
d′ (Green & Swets, 1966). Unlike the popular detection performance hit rate, d′ takes into
account also the false alarm rate: d′ = z(H) − z(FA) whereas z(H) refers to the z-
transformed hit rate and z(FA) to the z-transformed false alarm rate. As a consequence
d′ can be considered as criterion independent, i.e. d′ values are independent of whether a
screener behaves very risky and efficiently or whether the screener is very anxious.
Participants
Nineteen highly experienced aviation security experts from a large European airport par-
ticipated in this experiment (10 females). Due to security reasons and data protection no
absolute d′-values, hit rates and false alarm rates are reported.
Materials
The X-Ray Object Recognition Test (X-Ray ORT) was used to measure detection perfor-
mance. This test has been designed to analyze the influence of image based effects View
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Difficulty, Superposition and Bag Complexity on human detection performance when visu-
ally inspecting X-ray images of passenger bags. Inspired by signal detection theory (Green
& Swets, 1966), the X-Ray ORT consists of two sets of 128 X-ray images. One set contains
harmless bags without a threat item (N-trials, for noise). The other set contains the same
bags, each of them containing a threat object (SN-trials, for signal-plus-noise). Only guns
and knives of typical familiar shapes are used. This is important because the X-Ray ORT
is designed to measure cognitive visual abilities to cope with effects of View Difficulty,
Superposition, and Bag Complexity independent of specific visual knowledge about threat
objects. Due to the same reason a greyscale version of the X-Ray ORT was used for this
study. The X-Ray ORT consists of 256 items (X-ray images) given by the following test
design: 16 threat item exemplars (8 guns, 8 knives) x 2 View Difficulty levels x 2 Bag Com-
plexity levels x 2 Superposition levels x 2 trial types (SN and N-trials). The construction of
the items in all image based factor combinations as shown above was lead by visual plau-
sibility criteria. After choosing two sets of X-ray images of harmless bags with different
parameter values in Bag Complexity, the sixteen fictional threat items were projected into
the bags in two different view difficulties at two locations with different Superposition each.
The term fictional threat items (FTIs) is commonly used in connection with TIP systems as
discussed in the introduction. For further details on the X-Ray ORT see Hardmeier et al.
(2005); Schwaninger, Hardmeier, and Hofer (2005). Stimuli were displayed on 17” TFT
screens at a distance of about 100cm, so that the X-ray images subtended approximately
10-12 degrees of visual angle. The computer program measured outcome (hit, miss, false
alarm, correct rejection) and the response times from image onset to final decision button
press.
Procedure
X-ray images of passenger bags were shown for a maximum display duration of 4 seconds.
Note that at airport security controls the human operators (screeners) usually have only 3-6
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seconds to inspect a passenger bag. The participant’s task was to decide whether the image
is OK (i.e. the bag contains no threat item) or NOT OK (i.e. it contains a threat item)
by clicking one of the corresponding buttons on the screen (see Figure 4.2). In addition,
participants had to judge their confidence using a slider control (from UNSURE to SURE).
The confidence ratings are not used in this study. No feedback was given regarding the
correctness of the responses. Participants could initiate the next trial by pressing the space
bar.
Figure 4.2: Screenshot of an X-Ray ORT trial showing an X-ray image of a passenger
bag containing a gun. Response buttons and slider control are aligned at the bottom of the
screen.
Several practice trials were presented to make sure that the task was understood properly
before the test started. Immediately prior to the actual test, all guns and knives were pre-
sented on the screen for 10 seconds each threat category. This was done to minimize any
effects of threat item knowledge. Half of the items were shown in easy view and the other
half in difficult view.
4.3.2 Results
Figure 4.3 displays the mean d′-values and standard deviations broken up by main effects
of View Difficulty, Superposition, and Bag Complexity for guns and knives separately.
Data was first averaged across images for each participant and then across participants to
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calculate mean hit rate. Separate analyses of hit rates and false alarm rates are considered
to be published later.
Figure 4.3: Results of Experiment 1. Mean d′ detection performance of guns and knives,
broken up by main effects of View Difficulty, Superposition, and Bag Complexity. Data
was first averaged across images for each participant and then across participants to calcu-
late mean d′. Error bars represent the standard deviation across participants. Due to data
protection reasons, absolute d′-values are not published.
Our hypothesis whereby the image based factors have great influence on detection perfor-
mance was tested using repeated-measures ANOVA. Table 4.1 shows the main effects of
the image based factors for guns and knives separately. Effect sizes are given as η2 values.
All image based factors effects are highly significant.
4.3.3 Discussion
We were able to replicate the results from Schwaninger, Hardmeier, and Hofer (2005) and
Hardmeier et al. (2005) very well. As mentioned earlier, d′ equals z(H)− z(FA) whereas
H refers to hit rate and FA to false alarm rate (Green & Swets, 1966). Schwaninger,
Michel, and Bolfing (2007) showed in their APGV paper that effects of Bag Complexity
did not get significant when taking the hit rate as dependent variable alone. Only View Dif-
ficulty and Superposition had significant effects on the hit rate. Effects of Bag Complexity
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Table 4.1: Repeated Measures ANOVA Main Effects
Guns:
View Difficulty: η2 = .86 F (1, 18) = 110.41 p < .001
Superposition: η2 = .64 F (1, 18) = 32.44 p < .001
Bag Complexity: η2 = .45 F (1, 18) = 14.83 p < .001
Knives:
View Difficulty: η2 = .77 F (1, 18) = 60.89 p < .001
Superposition: η2 = .70 F (1, 18) = 42.30 p < .001
Bag Complexity: η2 = .63 F (1, 18) = 30.22 p < .001
are more likely to be found on false alarm rate. In X-ray screening tests, the false alarm
rate is based on the number of times a participant judges a bag to be NOT OK even though
there is no threat item in it. Since View Difficulty and Superposition only exist with bags
containing a threat item these findings are not too surprising.
4.4 Experiment 2
Experiment 2 was designed to investigate the perceptual plausibility of our image measure-
ments introduced in Experiment 3.
4.4.1 Method
Eleven out of the nineteen experts who had conducted Experiment 1 took part in Exper-
iment 2 showing a modified experimental setup. The participant’s task was to rate the
difficulties of the X-Ray ORT images regarding View Difficulty and Superposition of the
threat images. In addition, Clutter, Opacity and general item difficulty had to be rated for
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threat and non-threat images. As you noticed, the image based factor Bag Complexity was
replaced by two new image based factors Clutter and Opacity representing two different
aspects of Bag Complexity. This splitting of Bag Complexity was necessary to address the
two aspects separately in the development of the automatic image measurement algorithms
described in Experiment 3. The ratings were given by mouse clicks on a 50-point scale (0
= very low to 50 = very high). No initial position was set. Figure 4.4 shows a screenshot.
Figure 4.4: Screenshot of a typical trial of Experiment 2. All subjects were asked to judge
the image based factors subjectively, whereby Bag Complexity was separated in Clutter and
Opacity. Additionally, participants were asked to judge the general item difficulty as well
(not analyzed in this study). Threat items were displayed next to the bag. For non-threat
items, the slider controls for View Difficulty and Superposition were discarded.
4.4.2 Results
In order to estimate the relative importance of image based factors (Schwaninger, Hard-
meier, & Hofer, 2005) on human detection performance, we correlated ratings for View
Difficulty, Superposition, Clutter and Opacity (Experiment 2) with the hit rate data ob-
tained in Experiment 1. Data analysis was conducted separately for guns and knives.
Figure 4.5 shows the averaged ratings across all participants and across all threat items.
The ordinate depicts the rating scores on the 50-point scale (see Figure 4.4). The dark and
bright gray bars in each image based factors category represent the low and high parameter
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values according to the arrangement of the X-Ray ORT test design. Inter-rater consistency
was quite high with an average correlation (Fisher-corrected) between subjects of r = .61
for View Difficulty, r = .60 for Superposition, r = .62 for Clutter and r = .33 for Opacity.
Figure 4.5: Descriptive results from Experiment 2 for guns and knives separately. The im-
age based factor Bag Complexity from the X-Ray ORT is split into the sub-factors Clutter
and Opacity according to the rating experiment design shown in Figure 4.4.
Table 4.2 shows the correlations between the averaged (across subjects) human ratings of
the image based factors and d′-values per image.
Concerning the mathematical signs, note that d′ points in the opposite direction of threat
detection difficulty. The more difficult a threat item is to be detected the lower d′.
4.4.3 Discussion
Most subjective human ratings show correlations with d′ from Experiment 1 with quite low
significance levels even though many correlation did get significant at the 5% level. Thus,
the results from Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 showed that image based factors affect
objective X-ray image difficulty (d′) and that the image-based factors can be rated quite
consistently. For the development of image measurements, it was necessary to split up the
factor Bag Complexity into Clutter and Opacity. However, this seems to be problematic,
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Table 4.2: Correlation between Human Ratings and d′
Guns:
View Difficulty: r(64) = −.46 p < .001
Superposition: r(64) = −.66 p < .001
Opacity: r(64) = −.21 p = .095
Clutter: r(64) = −.25 p < .05
Knives:
View Difficulty: r(64) = −.24 p = .06
Superposition: r(64) = −.61 p < .001
Opacity: r(64) = −.32 p < .05
Clutter: r(64) = −.17 p = .173
because for subjective ratings they seem to be highly interdependent. The ratings of Clutter
and Opacity are highly correlated: r(64) = −.93, p < .001 for both guns and knives. We
return to this issue in section 4.3.
4.5 Experiment 3
The aim of Experiment 3 was to develop computer-based algorithms to automatically esti-
mate the image based factors View Difficulty, Superposition, Clutter, and Opacity. Unlike
in earlier studies dealing with the same image based factors, we decided to rename the
factor transparency into Opacity to take into account the mathematical sign of the image
measurement formula as described below as well as to fit increasing image based factor
values to increasing detection difficulties. The perceptual plausibility of these computer-
based algorithms was examined by correlating them with the human ratings obtained in
Experiment 2.
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4.5.1 Statistical Estimates and Image Measurements for Image Based
Factors
All image measurements developed for this purpose are based on theoretical considerations.
Different algorithm parameters were optimized by maximizing the correlations between the
image-based factors estimates and detection performance measures derived from earlier X-
Ray ORT findings. In the following all four image based factors are described separately
regarding their concepts, statistics and image measurement calculations:
FTI View Difficulty
Even with the aid of 3D volumetric models, it is not (yet) possible to satisfyingly deter-
mine the degree of a 3-dimensional rotation (View Difficulty) of a physical threat item
automatically from its 2-dimensional X-ray image (Mahfouz et al., 2005). Additional dif-
ficulties regarding image segmentation arise from the very heterogeneous backgrounds of
X-ray images, compare (Sluser & Paranjape, 1999). Therefore, this image based factor is
not (yet) being calculated by image processing, but post hoc from X-Ray ORT detection
performance data obtained in Experiment 1.
FtiVDOV j =
4∑
i=1,j 6=i
(4.65− d′OV i)
3
(4.1)
Equation 4.1 shows the calculation of the image based factor FTI View Difficulty, whereas
i is the summation index ranging from 1 to 4 (2 bag complexities x 2 Superpositions), j
denotes the index number of the X-ray image in question (one threat object (O) in one
of the two views (V)), d′OV j is its average d
′ across all participants and ’4’ is the number
of the bags each FTI was projected into. In order to avoid a circular argument in the
statistical model (multiple linear regression, see Experiment 4) by partial inclusion of the
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criterion variable into a predictor, d′ of the one item in question is excluded from this
estimate. The constant term 4.65 in the equation represents the maximum possible d′-value
and was introduced in order for FTI View Difficulty to point in the same direction as image
difficulty does. It is important to understand that this concept of FTI View difficulty is not
just reflecting the degree of rotation of an object. View difficulty as it is conceptualized
here reflects innate FTI View Difficulty attributes unique to each FTI view separately.
Superposition
This image based factor refers to how much the pixel intensities at the location of the FTI
in the threat bag image differ from the pixel intensities at the same location in the same bag
without the FTI. Equation 4.2 shows the image measurement formula for Superposition.
ISN(x, y) denotes the pixel intensities of a threat image and IN(x, y) denotes the pixel
intensities of the corresponding harmless bag. The subtraction of the square root term
from a constant is used in order for Superposition to point in the same direction as image
difficulty does. In this analysis the constant term C was set to 0.
SP = C −
√∑
x,y
(
ISN(x, y)− IN(x, y)
)2 (4.2)
It should be noted that this mathematical definition of Superposition is dependent on the
size of the threat item in the bag. For further development of the computational model it is
conceivable to split up Superposition and the size of the threat item into two separate image
based factors. Measurement of Superposition would require having both the bag with the
FTI and without it. For both applications mentioned in the introduction, this is possible with
current TIP and CBT technology. In TIP, the FTI, its location, the bag with and without the
FTI are recorded. In several CBT systems, the same information is recorded and stored,
too.
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Clutter
This image based factor is designed to express bag item properties like its textural unsteadi-
ness, disarrangement, chaos or just Clutter. In terms of the bag images presented, this factor
is closely related to the amount of items in the bag as well as to their structures in terms of
complexity and fineness. The method used in this study is based on the assumption, that
such texture unsteadiness can be described mathematically in terms of the amount of high
frequency regions.
CL =
∑
x,y
Ihp(x, y) (4.3)
where Ihp(x, y) = IN ∗ F−1(hp(fx, fy))
= F−1(F(IN · hp(fx, fy))
Equation 4.3 shows the image measurement formula for Clutter. It represents a convolution
of the empty bag image (N for noise) with the convolution kernel derived from a high-pass
filter in the Fourier space. IN denotes the pixel intensities of the harmless bag image. F−1
denotes the inverse Fourier transformation. hp(fx, fy) represents a high-pass filter in the
Fourier space (see Appendix).
Opacity
The image based factor Opacity reflects the extent to which X-rays are unable to penetrate
objects in a bag. This depends on the specific material density of these objects. These at-
tributes are represented in X-ray images as different degrees of luminosity. Heavy metallic
materials such as lead are known to be very hard to be penetrated by X-rays and therefore
appear as dark areas on the X-ray images.
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OP =
∑
x,y(IN(x, y) < 64)∑
x,y(IN(x, y) < 252)
(4.4)
Equation 4.4 shows the image measurement formula for Opacity. IN(x, y) denotes the
pixel intensities of the harmless bag. 64 is the pixel intensity threshold beneath which the
pixels are counted. The implementation of the image measurement for the image based
factor transparency is simply achieved by counting the number of pixels being darker than
a certain threshold (< 64) relative to the bag’s overall size (< 252, non-white pixels).
4.5.2 Method
To get a feeling of the relations between our image measurement estimates, the human
ratings and detection performance d′ the correlations between the image measurement es-
timates and d′ are presented in the following results section. To examine perceptual plau-
sibility of the computer based measurements, we correlated them with the human ratings
from Experiment 2.
4.5.3 Results
Correlation between Image Measurements and Detection Performance d′
Pearson’s product-moment correlations between the calculated measurements and d′ from
Experiment 1 were applied for each image based factor dimension separately. Table 4.3
shows the respective r-values and the corresponding significance levels.
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Table 4.3: Correlations between the Image Measurements and d′
Guns:
View Difficulty: r(64) = −.59 p < .001
Superposition: r(64) = −.38 p < .01
Opacity: r(64) = −.33 p < .01
Clutter: r(64) = −.08 p = .533
Knives:
View Difficulty: r(64) = −.39 p < .01
Superposition: r(64) = −.39 p < .01
Opacity: r(64) = −.31 p < .05
Clutter: r(64) = −.29 p < .05
Correlation between Image Measurements and Human Ratings
Pearson’s product-moment correlations between the calculated measurements and the cor-
responding human ratings’ mean values were applied for each image based factor dimen-
sion separately. Table 4.4 shows the bivariate correlations and their significance levels.
4.5.4 Discussion
Except for Clutter in guns all correlations between automated image measurements and
detection performance are significant. The correlation can be referred to as the direct effect
sizes of each of the image based factors measurement d′. For the over-all predictive power
of the measurements please refer to Experiment 4.
Except for Clutter almost all correlations between automated measurements and ratings
are significant. In the discussion of Experiment 2 the high inter-correlations between the
human ratings of the image based factors Clutter and Opacity was mentioned (r(64) =
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Table 4.4: Correlations between the Image Measurements and the Human Ratings
Guns:
View Difficulty: r(64) = .54 p < .001
Superposition: r(64) = .53 p < .001
Opacity: r(64) = −.69 p < .001
Clutter: r(64) = .15 p = .25
Knives:
View Difficulty: r(64) = .20 p = .113
Superposition: r(64) = .39 p < .01
Opacity: r(64) = −.64 p < .001
Clutter: r(64) = .08 p = .516
−.93, p < .001 for both guns and knives). Consistent with this result, there were also fairly
high inter-correlations between the corresponding calculated estimates of the image based
factors Clutter and Opacity (r(64) = .42, p < .001 for guns and r(64) = .36, p < .01 for
knives). Except for Clutter, we can conclude that our algorithms for automated estimation
of image based factors are perceptually plausible because they correlate significantly with
the ratings of novices.
4.6 Experiment 4
Experiment 4 was designed to evaluate the predictive power of a statistical model based on
automated estimation of image based factors. To this end, we now compare the results of
multiple linear regression analysis using the automated estimates of image based factors as
predictors with the results of multiple linear regression analysis using the human ratings of
image based factors as predictors.
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4.6.1 Method
Multiple Linear Regression Analysis
The predictors of the multiple linear regression model are our image based factors intro-
duced in Experiment 3. d′ per image averaged across subjects (Experiment 1) is the de-
pendent variable. We compared the two statistical models in terms of their goodness-of-fit
measures, their regression coefficient’s significances and the percentage of variance in the
dependent variable d′ the model is able to explain by its predictors.
4.6.2 Results
Figure 4.6 shows the scatter plots with regression standardized predicted values on the
abscissa and the actually measured d′ from Experiment 1 on the ordinate.
Figure 4.6: The four scatter plots from the models predicting d′ on the basis of all dis-
posable image based factors as predictors. Guns and knives are displayed separately. The
models based on the calculated predictors derived from image measurements are displayed
upon the models based on rated image based factors.
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Table 4.5 shows the most important statistical values of the four multiple linear regression
analyses arranged like in Figure 4.6. The single tables show the four predictors in the rows.
The first column gives the variable names of the image based factors. Standardized beta
weights are displayed in the second column and column three shows the p-value statistics
indicating the significance of the single regression coefficients in the model. The last line
shows the goodness-of-fit statistics of the model as a whole. R2 tells us to which extent
the model is able to predict the variance in d′. Because R2 increases with the number of
predictors independently of their predictive power, R2(adj) taking into account the number
of predictors is given, too. Finally the statistical indices F -value and the significance level
of the model as a whole (p-value) are given.
All statistical models are highly significant in the overall goodness-of-fit verification statis-
tics, both for guns and knives. TheR2-values, the extent to which a model is able to explain
the variance in the dependent variable by its predictors, are very high compared to values
usually obtained when predicting human performance. The model based on our image mea-
surements achieves an R2 of .47 (R2(adj)=.43) with guns and an R2 of .35 (R2(adj)=.30)
with knives. The ratings model is even better with an R2 of .51 (R2(adj)=.47) with guns
and an R2 of .48 (R2(adj)=.44) with knives.
4.6.3 Discussion
The different statistical models in Experiment 4 show that the image based factors sug-
gested by Schwaninger, Hardmeier, and Hofer (2005) are quite powerful predictors of
human detection performance. Such a model could therefore provide a basis for the en-
hancement of individually adaptive computer-based testing and training systems in which
the estimation of X-ray image difficulty is an essential component. In addition, the image
measurements developed in this study can be very useful for analyzing more reliable indi-
vidual TIP performance scores by taking into account image difficulty as explained in the
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Model Summaries (Per Category)
Guns Knives
β -weights p-values β -weights p-values
Im
ag
e
M
ea
su
re
m
en
ts
View Difficulty -.54 .000 -.29 .015
Superposition -.15 .117 -.31 .010
Opacity -.30 .008 -.19 .126
Clutter .03 .805 -.19 ..126
R2 .47 .35
R2(adj) .43 .30
F (4, 59) 13 8
p .000 .000
H
um
an
R
at
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gs
View Difficulty -.27 .009 .05 .647
Superposition -.54 .000 -.56 .000
Opacity -.04 .883 .944 .001
Clutter -.11 .672 .86 .002
R2 .51 .48
R2(adj) .47 .44
F (4, 59) 10 14
p .000 .000
Table 4.5: Statistical analysis tables of the models with the most important statistical values
of the multiple linear regression analyses. Each of the four tables shows the statistical
values of the verification of each regression coefficient separately in the rows. Additionally
the model’s overall goodness-of-fit verification values are given at the bottom row of each
model. In both statistical models, the dependent variable is the d′ from Experiment 1.
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introduction.
It is interesting to discuss the differences in the beta-weights between guns and knives in
the image processing model. For guns View Difficulty is weighted almost double compared
to Superposition. For knives the contrary pattern was observed. We are currently conduct-
ing additional analyses to find out whether this effect is related to differential changes by
3D rotation. The reason why Superposition is weighted much stronger in knives than in
guns is probably due to the Superposition formula which also reflects the size of the threat
items. In the X-Ray ORT knives differ much more in size than guns. Thus, the regression
coefficient patterns reflect actual characteristics of the FTI categories. The scatter plots
(Figure 4.6) reveal that there is a quite large ceiling effect. Therefore, it might be of value
to use non-linear regression for modeling d′ in the future. Apart from that, this study can be
viewed as the basis for further statistical models for the prediction of individual screener re-
sponses to single X-ray images using binary logistic regression. In addition, together with
the development of enhanced and additional image based predictors we intend to develop
parallel statistical models to predict hit rates as well as false alarm rates.
4.7 Experiment 5
In Experiment 5 we sought to replicate and refine the results of Experiment 4 by increasing
the number of test items and the subject sample size. A fifth image based factor, Bag Size,
was added to the other four, FTI View Difficulty, Superposition, Opacity and Clutter.
4.7.1 Method
For Experiment 5 we did not use the ORT. Instead a new test, based on the X-Ray CAT
(X-Ray Competency Assessment Test) by Koller and Schwaninger (2006), was designed.
Chapter 4: Model Consolidation II - Completing the Circle 75
We shall refer to this test as ’X-Ray Bag Size Test’, because it is the first test we use which
also measures Bag Size effects. In comparison to the X-Ray ORT, the X-Ray Bag Size Test
shows color images and has been expanded to include two additional categories of prohib-
ited items next to guns and knives: ’IEDs’ (Improvised Explosive Devices) and ’other’. The
Category other serves as a container for objects which do not fit the first three categories,
such as pepper sprays or tasers. With regards to possible statistical analyses the X-Ray
Bag Size Test has an analogous balancing of its image based factors FTI Category (guns,
knives, IEDs or other), View Difficulty, Superposition, Bag Complexity and Bag Size as
does the X-Ray ORT. To make the item sample even larger and allow a more precise anal-
ysis of the data, the X-Ray Bag Size Test contains 16 threat item exemplars per Category
instead of 8. Among other things, the larger item sample would allow us to see, whether the
relationships between the image based factors and detection performance d′ were indeed
linear (as is implicitly assumed by computing multiple linear regression models). Should
this not be the case appropriate prior data-transformations could be applied prior. In total
the test consisted of 2048 trials.
Participants
Trained as well as newly employed untrained screeners at a European airport employing
X-Ray Tutor. The data of 63 screeners is used in our analysis (Age M = 33.9, SD = 14.1).
Materials
In contrast to the X-Ray ORT the X-Ray Bag Size Test is not designed to measure cog-
nitive visual abilities independent of visual knowledge. Rather it is designed to provide a
measures of detection performance with high ecological validity. The focus of the X-Ray
Bag Size Test’s design lay on providing a tool for reliable measurement of the different
image based factors - including their interactions. The test consists of two sets of 1024 X-
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ray images. One set contains harmless bags without a threat item (N-trials, for noise). The
other set contains the same bags, each of them with a threat item (SN-trials, for signal-plus-
noise). The test design then is as follows: 16 FTIs x 4 FTI categories x 2 Superposition
levels x 2 View Difficulty levels x 2 Bag Complexity levels x 2 Bag Size levels x 2 trial
types (SN and N-trials) resulting in the total of 2048 items.
Procedure
The X-Ray Bag Size Test was embedded into existing X-Ray Tutor training systems, in use
at the airport. During screeners’ regular training sessions the X-Ray Bag Size Test items
would appear on screen in place of the usual X-Ray Tutor training items. Once the test was
completed X-Ray Tutor would resume its usual training functions. With over two thousand
items to solve, completing the test was likely to take several hours time. Screeners were
not required to solve the test in one continuous session. Thus the vast majority solved the
test in multiple sessions, spread out over a few days to several weeks. Apart from this the
testing procedure in the X-Ray Bag Size Test is analogous to the procedure in the X-Ray
ORT (see Experiment 1).
Figure 4.7: Screenshot of an X-Ray Tutor computer based test trial.
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Statistical Analyses
To assess the individual image based factors’ perceptual relevance for detection perfor-
mance, as in Experiment 3, Pearson’s product-moment correlation was used. To assess
the perceptual relevance of all image based factors combined, multiple linear regression
models were computed, as in Experiment 4.
4.7.2 Image Based Factors
For the X-Ray Bag Size Test some of the formulas for calculating image measurements had
to be adapted.
FTI View Difficulty
The same formula was used as in Experiment 3.
Superposition
The same formula was used as in Experiment 3. However scatter plot inspection revealed
a non-linear relationship between these Superposition values and d′. Thus an appropriate
data transformation for Superposition had to be found. This transformation proved to be the
negative logarithm of the negative Superposition. Superposition values had been defined
such that they were always negative. Thus we had to negate these Superposition values
before performing a logarithmic transformation. After the transformation we negated the
values back again, thereby ensuring that the resulting variable reflect the proper ordinal
relationships of the original Superposition values. This non-linear relationship between
Superposition and detection performance which our transformation function revealed, in-
deed seems plausible: Intuitively we would expect additional Superposition in images with
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already strongly superimposed FTIs to have a stronger effect on detection performance than
in images where the FTI is hardly superimposed at all.
Clutter
Concerning the use of the Clutter formula within this experiment, please note that the
summation term was standardized for Bag Size since Bag Size was implicitly included
within the Clutter formula used in Experiment 3. Please compare the Bag Size formula
below to the Bag Size formula under Equation 4.3 as applied in Experiment 3.
CL =
∑
x,y Ihp(x, y)
BS
(4.5)
For the details on the high pass filtering refer to Appendix A or Bolfing and Schwaninger
(2007).
Opacity
The denominator of the Opacity formula was subject to a minor change: The threshold of
the denominator (BS) changed from 252 to 254 since we no longer computed our formulas
on jpg images. jpg images needed a lower threshold to prevent distorted values due to
compression artifacts.
OP =
∑
x,y(IN(x, y) < 64)
BS
(4.6)
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Bag Size
Bag size is defined as the amount of pixels with a brightness value smaller than the bright-
ness value 254, with 255 representing the maximum brightness.
BS =
∑
x,y
(IN(x, y) < 254) (4.7)
4.7.3 Results
Pearson’s Product-Moment Correlations
Table 4.6 shows an overview of the correlations between the individual image based factors
and the measured performance d′ for the four categories of threat items, guns, knives, IEDs
and other. As in Experiment 3, View Difficulty is the strongest predictor for detection
performance d′ - with IEDs as the only exception: Detection performance for IEDs seems to
be virtually independent of view. Superposition has strong correlations in all four categories
of FTIs. Opacity sports comparatively low correlations and plays a more important role
with knives and IEDs than with guns or other. Finally, correlations for Clutter and Bag
Size are so low, that they do not reach statistical significance - the only exception being
Bag Size in the case of knives.
Figure 4.8 shows the scatter plots of the four multiple linear regression models, with re-
gression standardized predicted values on the x-axis plotted against measured detection
performance d’ on the y-axis. Table 4.7 gives an overview of the most important statistical
values of the four models. As in study 4, all statistical models are highly significant in the
overall goodness-of-fit verification statistics, indicated by theR2(adj) values. For guns and
knives R2(adj) values are very high. They are yet higher than the predictions of the mod-
els based on human ratings or the models based on computed image factors in Experiment
80 Chapter 4: Model Consolidation II - Completing the Circle
Figure 4.8: The four scatter plots from the models predicting d′ on the basis of all dis-
posable image based factors as predictors. Guns, knives, IEDs and other are displayed
separately.
4. The model for the FTI Category other has the highest predictive value of all, with an
R2(adj) of .680. For IEDs, with R2(adj)=.266 the goodness of fit of the model is the low-
est by far. To a considerable extent this will be due to the virtual non-correlation between
detection performance for IEDs and FTI View Difficulty. All predictors are significant,
mostly highly significant, except for two exceptions: Bag size which is never significant,
and FTI View Difficulty which is not significant in the model for IEDs.
4.7.4 Discussion
The data strongly suggest that designing a new and larger test paid off. The already very
high goodness-of-fit figures of the multiple linear regression models of Experiment 4 were
surpassed by a considerable margin by the models of Experiment 5. Although intuitively
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plausible, Bag Size turned out to play a negligible role in determining detection perfor-
mance. No beta weights and only one correlation reaching significance lead to this conclu-
sion. With regards to the importance of the different image based factors, for guns, knives
and other a similar pattern emerged: FTI View Difficulty played the most important role,
followed by Superposition. Opacity was a distant third. Clutter and Bag Size were largely
negligible. For IEDs however there is one big difference: View difficulty does not reach
significance in neither analysis.
4.8 General Discussion
Summarizing this article, we can state that our statistical model predicting detection per-
formance d′ as developed in Experiments 1-4 was very successfully approved by applying
it on a new data set in Experiment 5. The results of Experiment 5 reveal a better predictive
power of the model and more stable patterns in beta-weights than in Experiment 4. We
assume that the reason for these differences lies in the larger data set used in Experiment 5.
A closer look at the X-Ray ORT data reveals that there was a considerable ceiling effect,
decreasing the overall variance in the data, which makes it very difficult to get stable data.
Therefore we assume that the X-Ray ORT is too easy for expert screeners. Additionally it
could be stated that the number of 19 very well trained screeners solving 64 SN-N pairs per
FTI Category only in the X-Ray ORT (Experiment 1) is too small to get reliable statistical
model prediction as opposed to the 63 screeners (trained and untrained) solving 256 SN-N
pairs per FTI Category in the X-Ray Bag Size Test.
The formulae of image based factors introduced in this article promise to be powerful tools
for both real world applications and further scientific research. The ability to make precise,
perceptually plausible and valid measurements of image based factors leads to a plethora
of opportunities. Some possible applications such as individually adaptive training algo-
rithms in computer based training, or image difficulty estimation in threat image projection
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(TIP) were already mentioned in the introduction. Furthermore our research should prove
helpful for cost-benefit analyses in improving transport security. On the other hand highly
predictive models as these are valuable for researching underlying mechanisms in human
perception. For example, the virtual independence of Bag Size and detection performance
indicates that visual search only plays a marginal role in the mental processing involved in
this kind of detection task.
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Table 4.6: Correlations between the Image Measurements and the measured Detection
Performance d′
Guns: View Difficulty: r(256) = −.67 p < .001
Superposition: r(256) = −.60 p < .001
Opacity: r(256) = −.14 p < .05
Clutter: r(256) = −.06 p = .351
Bag Size: r(256) = −.03 p = .654
Knives:
View Difficulty: r(256) = −.69 p < .001
Superposition: r(256) = −.49 p < .001
Opacity: r(256) = −.28 p < .001
Clutter: r(256) = −.10 p = .103
Bag Size: r(256) = −.17 p < .01
IEDs:
View Difficulty: r(256) = −.09 p = .154
Superposition: r(256) = −.40 p < .001
Opacity: r(256) = −.29 p < .001
Clutter: r(256) = −.03 p = .63
Bag Size: r(256) = −.05 p = .473
Other:
View Difficulty: r(256) = −.79 p < .001
Superposition: r(256) = −.68 p < .001
Opacity: r(256) = −.16 p < .05
Clutter: r(256) = −.05 p = .438
Bag Size: r(256) = −.03 p = .600
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Model Summaries (Per Category)
Predictors Guns Knives IEDs Other
β p β p β p β p
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FTI View Difficulty −.52 .000 −.61 .000 −.09 .112 −.65 .000
-log(-Superposition) −.26 .000 −.21 .000 −.33 .000 −.21 .061
Opacity −.24 .000 −.36 .000 −.48 .000 −.30 .000
Clutter .15 .025 .14 .029 .32 .000 .19 .003
Bag Size .02 .664 −.06 .183 .08 .184 .06 .158
R2 .53 .62 .27 .69
adjustedR2 .52 .61 .25 .68
F (5, 250) 57 82 18 109
p .000 .000 .000 .000
Table 4.7: Statistical analysis tables of the models with the most important statistical values
of the multiple linear regression analyses. Each of the four tables shows the statistical
values of the verification of each regression coefficient separately in the rows. Additionally
the model’s overall goodness-of-fit verification values are given at the bottom row of each
model. In both statistical models, the dependent variable is the d′ obtained in Experiment
5.
Chapter 5
Appliance of the Model in the Political
Decision-Making Process
5.1 The Impact of Image Based Factors and Training on
Threat Detection Performance in X-ray Screening
In this study, two experiments are reported which investigated the relative importance of
five different image based factors and one human factor (Training) in mediating threat de-
tection performance of human operators in airport security X-ray screening. Experiment 1
was based on a random sample of roughly 16’000 records of threat image projection (TIP)
data. TIP is a software function available on state-of-the-art X-ray screening equipment
that allows the projection of fictional threat images (FTIs) into X-ray images of passenger
bags during the routine baggage screening operation. Analysis of main effects showed that
image based factors can substantially affect screener detection performance in terms of the
hit rate (identification of FTIs). There were strong effects of FTI View Difficulty (rotation
of FTIs) and Superposition of FTIs by other objects in the X-ray image of a passenger bag.
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The amount of Opacity in the X-ray image of a passenger bag had a small although signif-
icant effect on detection performance. The two image based factors Clutter and Bag Size
did not have a significant effect.
Experiment 2 was conducted using an offline-test in order to provide controlled and more
detailed data for analyzing the image based factors from Experiment 1, as well as the hu-
man factor of training. In particular the individual factors’ main effects on detection perfor-
mance, main effects of all factors taken together and factor interactions were analyzed. In
the test design the following image-based factors were varied systematically: Threat (FTI)
Category (guns, knives, improvised explosive devices, other threats), View Difficulty, Su-
perposition, Bag Complexity (a combination of Opacity and Clutter) and Bag Size. Data
were collected from 200 screening officers at five sites across Europe. For screener train-
ing all five sites use the same computer-based training system. Consistent with the results
obtained in Experiment 1, there were large main effects of Threat (FTI) Category, View
Difficulty, and Superposition. Again consistent with Experiment 1, effects of Bag Com-
plexity (Opacity and Clutter) and Bag Size were much smaller. In addition to Experiment
1, the number of computer based training (CBT) hours was available for each security of-
ficer participating in the study. Training turned out to be a key driver to improving threat
detection performance in X-ray screening and seemed to mediate the effects of some image
based factors.
This study was funded by the UK Department for Transport (DfT), on behalf of the ECAC1
Technical Task Force. The study was conducted in collaboration with QinetiQ Ltd. and
served as the scientific underpinning in the EU political decision-making process regarding
a possible bag size restriction with in the European Union. Recommendations regarding
the enhancement of human-machine interaction in X-ray screening are discussed.
1European Civil Aviation Conference
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5.2 Introduction
Screening passenger bags for threat items using state-of-the art X-ray machines is an es-
sential component of airport security. Previous works (Schwaninger, 2003b; Schwaninger,
Hardmeier, & Hofer, 2005; Schwaninger, Michel, & Bolfing, 2007) have identified image
based factors that affect human performance in X-ray screening tasks: object View Diffi-
culty, Superposition by other objects and Bag Complexity (Opacity and Clutter). Recently
the question has been raised whether Bag Size could be another image based factor that af-
fects detection of threat items when visually inspecting X-ray images of passenger bags. In
this study we determined effects and interactions of image based factors and human factors
(amount of recurrent computer-based training). In addition, with empirically based conclu-
sions regarding the importance of the Bag Size variable, by itself as well as in relation with
other performance relevant factors, this study provided the scientific basis for a political
decision-making process regarding the improvement of aviation security.
Two experiments are reported. Experiment 1 is based on threat image projection (TIP)
data. Experiment 2 is based on an off-line computer based test, which allows investigating
the combined effects of image-based factors, effects of training as well as factor interac-
tions. The use of these two methods to answer the same research question will ensure
that the overall approach is complementary. Both methods have their own strengths and
weaknesses: TIP data give high ecological validity but low experimental control; off-line
computer based tests using controlled stimuli allow more experimental control, but less
ecological validity. If both methods provide the same answer to the research question, this
can be taken as stronger evidence that the findings are genuine, and not simply an artefact
of the particular method used.
The two experiments both follow the paradigm using computer algorithms to estimate im-
age based factors that influence threat detection performance in X-ray screening. This
paradigm was developed at University of Zurich and presented at ICRAT 2006 in Bel-
grade (Bolfing, Michel, & Schwaninger, 2006a) and published (Schwaninger, Michel, &
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Bolfing, 2007; Bolfing, Michel, & Schwaninger, 2006b; Schwaninger, Michel, & Bolfing,
2005). None of these papers used TIP data for analysis, which ensures high ecological va-
lidity. Experiment 2 is based on a much larger data set than the previous studies, augment-
ing reliability. The inclusion of Bag Size and training as additional factors is completely
novel within this paradigm. Since threat detection performance in aviation security X-ray
screening depends on the X-ray images but also on the human screeners - the final decision
makers - human factors should not be neglected in a comprehensive model whose goal is
to explain the X-ray threat detection process.
5.2.1 Image Based Factors
Schwaninger (2003b) and Schwaninger, Hardmeier, and Hofer (2005) have identified three
image based factors which affect threat detection by X-ray screeners: View Difficulty,
Superposition, and Bag Complexity (see Figure 5.1).
View Difficulty:
Superposition:
Bag Complexity:
Figure 5.1: Illustration of the three basic image based factors suggested by Schwaninger
(2003b) and Schwaninger, Hardmeier, and Hofer (2005)
The concepts of these image based factors have been mathematically modeled (Schwaninger,
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Michel, & Bolfing, 2007). See Bolfing and Schwaninger (2007) for the latest version. View
difficulty is modeled as a statistically calculable value between 0 and 1 named FTI View
Difficulty. Superposition and Bag Complexity are modeled as image processing measure-
ments with Bag Complexity being split up into Clutter and Opacity. The introduction of
the image based factor Bag Size in this study necessitated normalization of earlier imple-
mentations of Clutter and Opacity regarding Bag Size. Formulae and short descriptions of
the underlying concepts are specified in Bolfing and Schwaninger (2007) in Appendix A.
5.3 Threat Image Projection (TIP) χ2 Analysis: Experi-
ment 1
5.3.1 Method
Threat Image Projection (TIP) Data
In order to ensure high ecological validity, we decided to analyze data from threat image
projection (TIP) systems. TIP is a software function of state-of-the-art X-ray screening
equipment used at security checkpoints in airports, nuclear power plants, navigation docks
etc. In aviation security TIP distinguishes between cabin baggage screening (CBS) and
hold baggage screening (HBS). In CBS, guns, knives, improvised explosive devices (IEDs)
and other threats are subject to identification and confiscation. In HBS, the focus rests
mainly on IEDs and dangerous goods such as gasoline containers or diver lamps. The cur-
rent investigation is confined to CBS. In CBS TIP, fictional threat items (FTIs) are occasion-
ally projected into X-ray images of passenger bags during the routine baggage screening
operation. A sufficiently large sample of TIP events allows statistically reliable measure-
ments of detection performance of human operators (X-ray screeners) on-the-job (Hofer &
Schwaninger, 2005) and thus with high ecological validity.
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The data basis of this study consists of a random sample of 16’329 TIP events that have
been routinely recorded on-the-job with approximately 700 professional X-ray screeners
throughout the first half of 2007 at a large European airport. We decided to apply χ2 anal-
yses to each image based factor separately to measure its impact on detection performance
in terms of hit rate (i.e. correctly judging a bag as being NOT OK).
χ2 Analysis
To compare the effects on detection performance of the independent variables2 FTI View
Difficulty, Superposition, Opacity, Clutter and Bag Size, the following procedures were ap-
plied to the TIP data described above. A histogram was created for each independent vari-
able (image based factor). For each variable the upper and lower 2.5% of the cases in the
data were excluded to remove outlier data from the analysis. Furthermore this made possi-
ble the definition of five equidistant bins with at least 100 data points each (TIP events).
Hit rates were calculated for each of the five equidistant bins to run χ2 tests with the null
hypothesis H0 that the hit rates are equal across bins. Effect size analysis based on Cohen
(1988) was used to compare the effect sizes of the different independent variables. For
detailed information on χ2 statistics see for example Coolican (2004).
5.3.2 Results
The results below are listed separately for each image based factor introduced above (see
Bolfing and Schwaninger (2007) for further information and formulae). Each of the fol-
lowing subsections begins with a graphical illustration of the image based factors’ effects
on the threat detection performance measure hit rate. The x-axes show the five equidistant
2The variables correspond to the continuously represented variables used in the multiple regression anal-
ysis in Experiment 2 (see Figure 5.8)
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bins into which the whole data range was subdivided. Low values are on the left, high val-
ues on the right. The y-axes show the hit rates of the image based factors’ bins. For reasons
of confidentiality hit rates cannot be given explicitly, but the hit rate scales are reasonably
chosen and kept constant throughout the whole document.
Following the graphical illustrations (Figures 5.2-5.6), statistical test values are given in
Tables 5.1-5.5. χ2 statistics can be interpreted as follows: the larger the χ2(df,N) value
the larger the effect. Additionally χ2 effect sizes w are given. Again, the larger the effect
size, the larger the effect. However, please be aware that χ2 and w values do not state the
direction of the effect.
To summarize the χ2 analysis results a bar plot graphic is provided at the end of this section
illustrating the χ2 effect sizes of the five image based factors on the hit rate (see Figure 5.7).
The image based factors are arranged such that their effects decrease in size.
Figure 5.2 illustrates the large impact of FTI View Difficulty on human detection perfor-
mance in terms of hit rate. This is partly due to the fact that objects are more difficult
when depicted from an unusual viewpoint (see Figure 5.1). Other factors contributing to
this large impact are the Threat Category of the object and the training of human operators
(see Experiment 2). Figure 5.3 illustrates the large effect of Superposition on detection
performance. Figure 5.4 shows the significant but relatively small influence of Opacity on
detection performance in terms of hit rate. Here the question arises whether it is Opacity
as a perceptual concept that does not have much influence on threat detection performance,
or whether the image measurement formula of Opacity is not properly modeled. Figure 5.5
illustrates the hit rates of the five Clutter bins. There is no significant effect of Clutter
on detection performance. As with Opacity, the question arises whether it is the concept
of Clutter that does not influence hit rates in TIP, or whether the computational model of
Clutter needs to be improved. Figure 5.6 shows the effect of Bag Size on hit rate in TIP.
As with Clutter, the effect of Bag Size on detection performance does not reach statistical
significance.
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FTI View Difficulty
Figure 5.2: Illustration of the impact of FTI View Difficulty on hit rate.
Table 5.1: χ2 Analysis Results: FTI View Difficulty
χ2 value χ2(4, N = 13′541) = 198.04
Significance Highly significant: p < .001
χ2 effect size w = .12
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Superposition
Figure 5.3: Illustration of the impact of Superposition on hit rate.
Table 5.2: χ2 Analysis Results: Superposition
χ2 value χ2(4, N = 13′713) = 72.98
Significance Highly significant: p < .001
χ2 effect size w = .07
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Opacity
Figure 5.4: Illustration of the impact of Opacity on hit rate.
Table 5.3: χ2 Analysis Results: Opacity
χ2 value χ2(4, N = 13′718) = 9.90
Significance Significant: p < .05
χ2 effect size w = .03
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Clutter
Figure 5.5: Illustration of the impact of Clutter on hit rate.
Table 5.4: χ2 Analysis Results: Clutter
χ2 value χ2(4, N = 13′726) = 0.98
Significance Not significant: p = .913
χ2 effect size w = .01
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Bag Size
Figure 5.6: Illustration of the impact of Bag Size on hit rate.
Table 5.5: χ2 Analysis Results: Bag Size
χ2 value χ2(4, N = 13′758) = 4.45
Significance Not significant: p = .348
χ2 effect size w = .02
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Comparison of the χ2 Effect Sizes
In Figure 5.7, the effect sizes w are compared. The factor FTI View Difficulty has the
highest effect size with w = .12, while Clutter shows the lowest effect size with w = .01.
The factors Opacity, Bag Size and Clutter show small effect sizes. The effects of Clutter
and Bag Size did not reach statistical significance.
Figure 5.7: Comparison of the effect sizes among the image based factor.
5.3.3 Discussion
The results obtained in Experiment 1 are consistent with earlier findings. Schwaninger,
Hardmeier, and Hofer (2005) found that View Difficulty, Superposition and Bag Complex-
ity affect screener performance. Schwaninger, Michel, and Bolfing (2007) replicated these
results (see Chapter 2). Using similar image measurements as in Experiment 1, they mea-
sured similar effects for FTI View Difficulty, Superposition, Opacity and Clutter. However,
several caveats are necessary to qualify the appropriateness of the results obtained in Exper-
iment 1. Firstly, an analysis of auto-archived bags indicated that, as would be anticipated,
it is likely that TIP aborts are selectively eliminating certain bags (e.g. small bags rather
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than large bags) from the TIP image set, and thus reducing their presence. Secondly, it is
not always clear how closely aligned TIP scores are with the specific operational situations
encountered when threats are deliberately hidden in difficult bags. But most importantly, in
Experiment 1 only main effects were analyzed. In order to gain a more complete picture it
is important to conduct a more controlled experiment in which main effects in combination
and their interactions can be measured reliably. This was done in Experiment 2.
5.4 Off-line Computer Based Test: Experiment 2
5.4.1 Method
Participants
200 X-ray screeners from five European airports with varying amounts of training in X-ray
image interpretation agreed to participate in this study.
Stimuli
The stimuli consisted of 1024 X-ray images of passenger bags containing a threat item (SN
trials; signal-plus-noise) and the same 1024 bags not containing any prohibited items (N
trials; noise). The SN trial images were created by projecting fictional threat items (FTIs)
into 1024 X-ray images of bags. FTIs for the study were eight visually similar pairs of
each of four types of threat items: guns, knives, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and
’other’ threats. Images of cabin baggage were captured from X-ray machines at a European
airport using the auto-archive function. The images were revised by three airport security
supervisors to remove inappropriate images (e.g. images containing more than one bag,
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images containing incomplete bags, bags containing prohibited items or liquids, etcetera).
This procedure resulted in 7606 bag images. Additional review by the QinetiQ team (our
collaboration team) resulted in a total of 6659 bag images from which the 1024 bags needed
for the study were drawn. The final 1024 bags used for the study were chosen through a
process of projecting the relevant FTIs into the bags such that the variables of interest
would be orthogonal in the stimulus set. Several full sets of 2048 images (the 1024 images
containing the FTIs, and the same images without FTIs) were created. The one with the
most desirable properties in terms of variable orthogonality was chosen for use in the study.
Design
The study employed a 4 (FTI Category: guns, knives, IEDs, other) x2 (View Difficulty:
easy, difficult) x2 (Superposition: low, high) x2 (Bag Complexity: low, high) x2 (Bag Size:
small, large) x2 (image type: SN, N) within-participants design. Since there were 16 FTIs
in each Category, this design results in a total of 16x4x2x2x2x2x2 = 2048 images which
were to be presented to the screeners. The images were presented to the screeners in a
random order in multiple testing sessions of 20 minutes each. As dependent variable the
detection performance measure d′ (Green & Swets, 1966) was used. This measure provides
a more valid estimate of detection performance than the hit rate alone because it takes the
hit rate and the false alarm rate into account (see (Hofer & Schwaninger, 2004) for different
measures of X-ray detection performance). Since the off-line test showed each bag once
with a threat item and once without, accurate measurements of hit and false alarm rates
could be obtained.
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5.4.2 Results
Data were analyzed in two ways. Firstly, by treating the variables FTI View Difficulty, Su-
perposition, Opacity, Clutter, and Bag Size as continuous, a linear regression was employed
to assess the main effects of each image based factor on threat detection performance sep-
arately. A multiple linear regression was used to examine the main effects together. Addi-
tionally, we calculated a linear regression with hours of recurrent computer based training
prior to testing as predictor. In order to examine main effects as well as interactions between
the variables, the variables FTI Category, View Difficulty, Superposition, Bag Complexity
and Bag Size, all transformed into discrete variables with two parameter values low and
high, were used in an analysis of covariance (ANCOVA). Training hours served as the co-
variate variable in the ANCOVA. Figure 5.8 shows the way in which the continuous and
discrete variables are related to each other. Due to a high inter-correlation and a test de-
sign that demands independence of its variables, Opacity and Clutter were encoded into the
single discrete variable Bag Complexity. FTI Category and View Difficulty were encoded
into a single continuous variable because it is not sensible to encode either variable directly
into a continuous variable. Instead we defined the variable FTI View Difficulty as the diffi-
culty - as measured in threat detection performance (d′) - screening officers had in solving
a specific threat item in a specific view (easy or difficult) across all other conditions (i.e.
Superposition, Bag Complexity and Bag Size).
Linear Regression and Multiple Linear Regression
The regression analyses will help us understand the direct relationship between image
based factors and d′, as well as training hours and d′. Figure 5.9 shows the relative ef-
fect sizes, the absolute values of the correlations with the dependent variable d′, for the
individual variables. For Superposition and training hours a logarithmic transformation
was applied. This transformation was necessary in order to achieve a linear relationship
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Figure 5.8: Illustration of the relationship between discrete and continuous representations
of the independent variables
between Superposition and detection performance d′. With .70, .63 and .58, FTI View
Difficulty, training hours and Superposition all have very high effect sizes. Opacity has a
moderate to small effect size with .22, Clutter and Bag Size have very small effect sizes
with .05 and .07, respectively. Except for Clutter, all correlations are statistically signifi-
cant.
Figure 5.9: Illustration of effect sizes R
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Figure 5.6 shows the results of the multiple linear regression with all image based factors:
FTI View Difficulty, Superposition (logarithmically transformed), Opacity, Clutter and Bag
Size. It shows the overall effect size, again the absolute value of the correlation R, of all
the image based factors taken together. With R = 0.77 the effect size is very high. The
effect size of the only human factor analyzed (hours of recurrent computer based training),
with R = 0.63, is also large. We can see that in the multiple linear regression model the
factor Bag Size is the only one not reaching statistical significance. Put another way: In the
presence of the other image based factors Bag Size did not lead to a statistically significant
change in detection performance in our experiment. As shown in Figure 5.10 adding Bag
Size to the linear model only leads to a minimal increase of its effect size from R = 0.772
to R = 0.773.
Model Summaries (All Categories)
Predictors Beta weights Significance
β p
Im
ag
e
B
as
ed
Fa
ct
or
s
FTI View Difficulty .568 .000
logSuperposition -.227 .000
Opacity -.366 .000
Clutter .223 .000
Bag Size .030 .193
R2 = .60, adjusted R2 = .60, p < .000
Table 5.6: Tabular summary of the general multiple linear regression models for all threat
item categories. Standardized beta weights and p-values.
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Figure 5.10: Combined effect size of image based factors and effect size of training
ANCOVA
A repeated measures analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) was conducted to analyze the main
effects of image based factors, their interactions and their interactions with training. As can
be seen in the main effects summary of Figure 5.11 the repeated measures ANCOVA leads
to only a slightly different pattern with regards to effect sizes than the linear regression anal-
yses. These differences are due to the fact that, in contrast to the linear regression models,
in the ANCOVA analysis effects of the covariate training hours are isolated from the effects
of image based factors. Furthermore, in the ANCOVA inter-individual differences between
screening officers (’screener variance’) are taken into account. Superposition shows the
largest effect size (η2), followed by FTI Category, Bag Complexity and View Difficulty.
The main effect of Bag Size is clearly smaller than the main effect of any other image
based factor. Training hours has noteworthy interactions with FTI Category and View Dif-
ficulty. These interactions make sense, since we know from other studies that training can
lead to comparatively larger performance increases for items that are comparatively diffi-
cult for novices (Koller, Hardmeier, Hofer, & Schwaninger, 2008) - for example improvised
explosive devices (threat item category) or difficult views (View Difficulty). There is also
104 Chapter 5: Appliance of the Model in the Political Decision-Making Process
a small interaction of training with Bag Size, indicating that well trained screening officers
are less affected by effects of Bag Size. Figure 5.12 gives an overview of the 10 largest
interactions in the ANCOVA. All in all over 30 interactions reached statistical significance.
Since the effect sizes of most interactions are very small we decided only to report inter-
actions η2 ≥ .07. The interaction of View Difficulty with Threat Category can at least
partly be explained by the fact that detection performance of improvised explosive devices
- unlike guns or knives - is largely independent of viewpoint. The interaction of Super-
position with View Difficulty indicates that with difficult viewpoints Superposition plays
a larger role in determining detection performance than with easy views. The interaction
of Superposition with Threat Category indicates that some threat item categories are more
sensitive to Superposition than others. For example, from the regression analysis above we
know that Superposition effects are higher with knives than with guns.
Figure 5.11: Illustration of ANCOVA main effects and interactions with the covariate train-
ing hours
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Figure 5.12: Illustration of the the ten largest ANCOVA interactions
5.4.3 Discussion
With an overall correlation of .77 the linear modeling of detection performance with im-
age based factors has a very high explanatory power. Superposition, although not always
with the largest effect size, has shown the most robust effects on detection performance.
Interestingly and in contrast to what one might have expected based on the results of the
regression analyses, the variable Bag Complexity (a combination of Opacity and Clutter)
showed a large effect size in the ANCOVA. Apart from this, the ANCOVA results reflect
the regression analysis results closely, both in main effects and interactions. Threat Cat-
egory and View Difficulty had considerable interactions with the covariate training hours.
This shows that training is particularly effective in the case of difficult item categories such
as IEDs and for difficult viewpoints. Bag size, although intuitively plausible as relevant
factor, turned out to play only a minor role in determining threat detection performance.
The same is true for Clutter.
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5.5 General Discussion
There were large main effects of View Difficulty and of FTI Category in all of the analyses,
as expected. The same was true for Superposition and Bag Complexity (to a bigger extent
for Opacity than for Clutter). Clearly, these factors need to be taken into account in any
future work on performance-relevant image based factors. When looking at the influence
on detection performance of all image based factors together, there is no statistically signif-
icant effect of Bag Size. When using a more sophisticated model of data analysis including
main effects of FTI View Difficulty, Superposition, Bag Complexity, Bag Size and the in-
teractions of these variables, there is a small effect of Bag Size. In Experiment 2 we were
also able to examine the effect of the number of CBT training hours on threat detection per-
formance. The key finding from the study is that the effect size for this variable was large,
and seemed to mediate the effect of some image based factors on threat detection. Clearly,
training is a key driver to improving threat detection performance in X-ray screening, and
more work needs to be done to establish exactly which image based factors screeners need
to be trained in to give the best improvements in threat detection accuracy.
5.6 Recommendations for Improving Human-Machine In-
teraction in X-Ray Screening
5.6.1 FTI View Difficulty and Superposition
The factor FTI View Difficulty refers to the fact that the identification of threat objects, as
objects in general, is highly dependent on their viewpoint as well as on properties of the
very object itself. Current X-ray screening equipment provides only one X-ray image per
passenger bag. More recent technology can provide multiple views of a bag. Figure 5.13
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illustrates how such new systems might be able to reduce the detection problems due to
View Difficulty and Superposition. Objects that are superimposed by other objects from
one perspective may be clearly visible from another one. Furthermore, training is an impor-
tant tool in lessening detrimental effects on detection performance of difficult views. Our
ANCOVA analysis has supported earlier findings that training leads to particularly large
improvements in detection performance for difficult views (Koller et al., 2008).
Figure 5.13: Illustrative example of how multi-view systems can help improving detection
performance in spite of undesirable View Difficulty and Superposition effects.
5.6.2 Opacity
The image based factor Opacity refers to the amount of opaque areas in an X-ray image.
X-ray systems with higher penetration have the potential to reduce detection problems due
to Opacity. In addition, it is possible to implement image measurement algorithms in X-
ray equipment that warn the human operator (X-ray screener) with a ”dark alarm”, which
would be triggered by opaque areas that are deemed too large or dense for unassisted human
interpretation. Manual search would follow when a dark alarm was indicated.
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5.6.3 Screener Selection and Training
A very important approach to face the problem of improving threat detection performance
in X-ray screening consists in screener selection and screener training. The psychological
literature provides evidence that figure ground segregation (related to Superposition) as
well as mental rotation (related to View Difficulty) are visual abilities that are fairly stable
within a person. For example Hofer, Hardmeier, and Schwaninger (2006) and Hardmeier
et al. (2006b) have shown that using computer based object recognition tests in a pre-
employment assessment procedure can help to increase detection performance of screeners
substantially.
In addition to stable abilities, there are several aspects of visual knowledge relevant to
X-ray image interpretation. Knowledge based factors such as knowing which objects are
dangerous or prohibited and what they look like in X-ray images are trainable. Training also
has beneficial effects on screeners’ abilities to deal with certain image based factors. For
example, training particularly improves the ability to deal with difficult views. Computer-
based training can be a powerful tool to improve X-ray image interpretation competency of
screeners Koller et al. (2008); Schwaninger, Hofer, and Wetter (2007); Ghylin et al. (2006).
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Appendix A
Formulary
A.1 Image Measurement Formulary
A.1.1 Method
All image measurements developed for this purpose are based on theoretical considerations.
Different algorithm parameters were optimized by maximizing the correlations between the
image-based factors estimates and detection performance measures derived from earlier X-
Ray ORT findings from x-ray screening experts.
FTI View Difficulty
Even with the aid of 3D volumetric models, it is not (yet) possible to satisfyingly de-
termine the degree of a 3-dimensional rotation (view difficulty) of a physical threat item
automatically from its 2-dimensional x-ray image (Mahfouz et al., 2005). Additional dif-
ficulties regarding image segmentation arise from the very heterogeneous backgrounds of
x-ray images, compare (Sluser & Paranjape, 1999). Therefore, this image based factor is
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not(yet) being calculated by image processing, but statistically from X-Ray ORT detection
performance data obtained in Experiment 1. Equation A.1 shows the general a posteriori
statistical formula for FTI View Difficulty as applied in chapters 1-4. Equation A.3 is the
more specific formula used in TIP data analysis presented in chapter 5.
FtiVDOV j =
NOV∑
i=1,j 6=i
(max(DetPerf)− DetPerfOV i)
NOV − 1 (A.1)
FtiVDOV j =
4∑
i=1,j 6=i
(4.65− d′OV i)
3
(A.2)
FtiVDOV =
NOV∑
i=1
MissRateOV i
NOV
(A.3)
The general FTI View Difficulty formula depicted in Equation A.1 reads as follows:
FtiVDOV j represents the indexed abbreviation of the FTI View Difficulty of the X-ray im-
age (or SN-N X-ray image pair, in question, indexed by j. Basically, the FTI View Difficulty
formula is just the average of all detection performance values containing a fictional threat
item in a certain view. The indexOV j represents a certain FTI object (index O) in a certain
view (index V) presentedNOV times in a test or in TIP. In order to adjust the resulting value
to the direction representing difficulty the measured detection performance (DetPerfOV i)
is subtracted from the theoretical maximum detection performance value. In case of the
analyzed threat detection performance measure being d′ max(DetPerf) is set to 4.65. In
case of the hit rate or A′ being the analyzed detection performance max(DetPerf) is set
to 1.0. In short, FTI View Difficulty is calculated by averaging the inverted threat detection
performance across all X-ray images containing a certain FTI, but excluding the X-ray im-
age in question from averaging. In case of the analyzed test being X-Ray ORT, for example,
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the number of images included in the averaging is three (Equation A.2). NOV is four (2 bag
complexities x 2 superpositions) whereby one image is excluded (NOV −1). The exclusion
of the one item in questions necessitates from avoiding circular arguments in multiple linear
regression analyses. Equation A.3 represents the FTI View Difficulty formula as it was used
in TIP data analysis in chapter 5. Due to the enormous size of the TIP data set for FTI View
Difficulty estimation (191677 TIP events), we refrained from excluding the one image in
question from averaging. In our TIP data analysis each of the 2010 FTIs was projected 95
times during the half-year period on average. In this case, the effect of a possible circular
argument diminished to a fraction of about 1%. Further, the reason why the miss rate was
used instead the generally used expression max(DetPerf) − DetPerfOV is that in TIP,
no false alarm rates can be recorded. Therefore, the detection performance used is the hit
rate only. Correspondent to the general formula, 1 − hitrate = missrate, the theoretical
maximum detection performance minus the actually measured detection performance.
It is important to understand that this concept of FTI View Difficulty is not just reflecting
the degree of rotation of an object. In that case there would be two parameter values for
all threat exemplars only. View Difficulty as it is conceptualized here reflects innate view
difficulty attributes unique to each exemplar view separately.
Superposition
This image based factor refers to how much the pixel intensities at the location of the FTI
in the threat bag image differ from the pixel intensities at the same location in the same
bag without the FTI. Equations A.4 - A.5 all show slightly different implementations of
the image based factors measurements of Superposition. All formulas are based on the
same principle. In all equations ISN(x, y) denotes the pixel intensity values of a threat item
image and IN(x, y) denotes the pixel intensity values of the corresponding bag image not
containing any threat item. Equation A.4 shows the Superposition formula as implemented
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in the study in chapter 2. Equation A.5 shows the Superposition formula as implemented
in chapters 3 to 5. The only difference as opposed to Equation A.4 is the constant term
C which is arbitrary. Basically, the subtraction of Superposition as in Equation A.5 was
introduced to invert the direction of the Superposition value such that it fits with detection
performance difficulty of the images. The constant term C only serves as an aesthetic
correction to make values positive. Therefore C can be freely chosen depending on the
Superposition value range from Equation A.4. For pure calculation purposes we suggest to
set C to 0. In chapters 3 and 4, where enough data points were available to estimate the
true relationship between Superposition and detection performance, a log-transform was
applied to the Superposition values as in Equations A.4 - A.5. The corresponding formulae
can easily be reconstructed and are not given here.
SP =
√∑
x,y
(
ISN(x, y)− IN(x, y)
)2 (A.4)
SP = C −
√∑
x,y
(
ISN(x, y)− IN(x, y)
)2 (A.5)
It should be noted that this mathematical definition of superposition is dependent on the
size of the threat item in the bag. For further development of the computational model it is
conceivable to split up superposition and the size of the threat item into two separate image
based factors. Measurement of superposition would require having both the bag with the
FTI and without. For both applications mentioned in the introduction, this is possible with
current TIP and computer-based training (CBT) technology. In TIP, the FTI, its location,
the bag with and without the FTI are recorded. In several CBT systems, the same informa-
tion is recorded and stored, too.
To date, Superposition values are applied to greyscale images only. But since colour coding
is an important improvement in state-of-the-art X-ray machines, the Superposition mea-
surement algorithms will be applied to the single colour coding channels in the near future.
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Together with the implementation of our image based factor Colour Saliency, which is
not subject to this dissertation, we expect this to further enhance our image based factors
models.
Clutter
This image based factor is designed to express bag item properties like its textural unsteadi-
ness, disarrangement, chaos or just clutter. In terms of the bag images presented, this factor
is closely related to the amount of items in the bag as well as to their structures in terms of
complexity and fineness. The method used in this study is based on the assumption, that
such texture unsteadiness can be described mathematically in terms of the amount of high
frequency regions.
CL =
∑
x,y Ihp(x, y)
BS
(A.6)
where Ihp(x, y) = IN ∗ F−1(hp(fx, fy))
= F−1(F(IN · hp(fx, fy))
Equation A.6 shows the image measurement formula for Clutter. It represents a convo-
lution of the empty bag image (N for noise) with the convolution kernel derived from a
high-pass filter in the Fourier space. IN denotes the pixel intensities of the harmless bag
image. F−1 denotes the inverse Fourier transformation. hp(fx, fy) represents a high-pass
filter in the Fourier space.
Clutter formula high-pass filter where fx and fy are its frequency components, f is its
cut-off frequency and where d is its fall-off.
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hp(fx, fy) = 1− 1
1 +
(√
f2x+f
2
y
f
)d (A.7)
This high-pass filter represents a 2-D matrix in the Fourier frequency space. Therefore an
inverse Fourier transformation is applied to transform it into a convolution kernel in the
spatial domain.
Unfortunately, to date all experiments and applications including Clutter as a predictor vari-
able regarding threat detection performance showed quite disappointing effects of Clutter.
We are actually quite confident that it is not our theoretical concept of Clutter but its com-
putational implementation which must be subject to a major revision. This is quite a chal-
lenge. What seems to be a highly complex image from a computer perspective might be
easily perceived by humans and vice versa. As an example, images of human faces may
consist of highly complex pixel patterns, but are perceived by humans very fast and reli-
ably. In informatics, on the other hand, a huge amount of compression algorithms exist that
allow to highly reduce complexity in structures that humans perceive as highly complex.
Tracking down this gap between computational complexity and complexity as perceived
by human minds is far from being examined and understood in scientific literature.
Opacity
The image based factor Opacity, designated Transparency in earlier studies, reflects the
extent to which X-rays are able to penetrate objects in a bag. This depends on the spe-
cific material density of these objects. These attributes are represented in X-ray images as
different degrees of luminosity. Heavy metallic materials, such as lead for example, are
known to be very hard to be penetrated by X-rays and therefore appear as dark areas on
X-ray images.
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OP =
∑
x,y
(
IN(x, y) < 64
)
BS
(A.8)
Equation A.8 shows the image measurement formula for Opacity. IN(x, y) denotes the
pixel intensities of the harmless bag. threshold is the pixel intensity threshold beneath
which the pixels are counted. The implementation of the image measurement for the image
based factor Opacity is simply achieved by counting the number of pixels being darker
than a certain threshold relative to the bag’s overall size. In this dissertation the threshold
was consistently set to 64, which equals one fourth of the whole pixel intensity range. The
denominator in Equation A.5 equals Bag Size (BS) as described in the next section.
Bag Size
As already mentioned under Opacity, the formula for Bag Size just expresses the fact that
all non-white pixels of the X-ray image are counted. In this dissertation we set the threshold
for non-white pixels to 254 instead of 255, due to possible image capture artifacts of the
X-ray machines.
BS =
∑
x,y
(IN(x, y) < 254) (A.9)
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Main activities and responsibilities EU project management, data analysis,
reporting, presenting
Name and address of employer Max Planck Institute for Biological Cybernetics,
Speemannstr. 38, D-72076 Tu¨bingen
Type of business or sector Aviation security; cognitive and computational
psychophysics department
Dates 2004 - 2006
Occupation or position held Research assistant
Main activities and responsibilities Data analysis (statistical modeling),
quality control management
Name and address of employer University Zurich, Klosbachstrasse 107,
CH-8032 Zu¨rich
Type of business or sector Aviation security
Dates 2003 - 2004
Occupation or position held Research assistant
Main activities and responsibilities Data analysis (statistical modeling),
quality control management
Name and address of employer Applied Psychological Science Solutions GmbH
Type of business or sector Aviation security; cognitive psychology
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Dates January - August 1999
Occupation or position held Internship
Main activities and responsibilities IT migration
Name and address of employer Zu¨rcher Kantonalbank, Neue Hard 11, 8005 Zu¨rich
Type of business or sector Logistics
Education and training
Dates 1999 - 2006
Title of qualification awarded A Statistical Approach for Image Difficulty
Estimation in X-Ray Screening
Using Image Processing Algorithms
Principal subjects/ occupational Studies in Psychology, Neurophysiology
skills covered and Philosophy
Name and type of organization University Zurich
providing education
Level in national or international MSc UZH, Psychologist1
classification
Dates Fall 2004
Principal subjects/ occupational Assessment Center, competitor analysis, office
skills covered
Name and type of organization xcg executive consulting group,
providing training executive assessment center
Level in national or international Internship
classification
Dates Fall 2003
Principal subjects/ occupational Psychophysics, saccade adaptation
skills covered
Name and type of organization Ludwig Maximilian University, Munich
providing education
Level in national or international Internship
classification
Dates 1996 - 1998
Principal subjects/ occupational Studies in Physics and Mathematics
skills covered
Name and type of organization ETH Zu¨rich
providing education
Level in national or international not completed
classification
122 Appendix B: Addendum - Curriculum Vitæ
Personal skills and
competences
Mother tongue German
Other languages English (good), French (basic), Italian (basic)
Social skills and competences Team Work: Always very good experiences
and feedback in a lot of temporal occupations
Organisational skills and competences During the work at VICOREG acquiring good
skills in coordinating projects, dealing with
project partners and customers
Technical skills and competences Competent in quantitative and qualitative
research methods, experimental designing,
data analysis
Computer skills and competences Fully competent with most Microsoft computer
programs (MS Windows, MS Excel, MS Word,
MS Powerpoint, MS Project, MS Access),
Matlab programming (numerical computation),
LaTeX (typesetting), SPSS & R (statistics),
Adobe Photoshop, and some Java programming
Artistic skills and competences Guitar, some painting, design
Driving licence Swiss car driving license
Additional Information Teaching Experience
Laboratory Practical Course Lecture at the
Department of Industrial and Organisational
Psychology, University of Zurich
(Experimental-psychologisches Praktikum der
Abteilung Arbeits- & Organisationspsychologie
der Universitt Zu¨rich)
Collaborations
Max Planck Institute for Biological Cybernetics,
Tu¨bingen, Germany (Prof. H.H. Bu¨lthoff);
Zurich State Police, Airport Division (F. Hofer);
Airport Security Clearance, Bulgaria (A. Yankov)
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Publications
Peer Reviewed Articles Schwaninger, A., Bolfing, A., Halbherr, T., Helman, S., Belyavin, A., &
Hay L. (2008). The impact of image based factors and training on threat
detection performance in X-ray screening. Proceedings of the 3rd In-
ternational Conference on Research in Air Transportation, ICRAT 2008,
Fairfax, Virginia, USA, June 1-4, 2008, 317-324
Schwaninger, A., Michel, S., & Bolfing, A. (2007). A statistical ap-
proach for image difficulty estimation in x-ray screening using image
measurements. Proceedings of the 4th Symposium on Applied Percep-
tion in Graphics and Visualization, ACM Press, New York, USA, 123-
130
Bolfing, A., Michel, S., & Schwaninger, A. (2006b). A statistical ap-
proach for automated image difficulty estimation in x-ray screening using
image processing algorithms. Proceedings of the 4th International Avia-
tion Security Technology Symposium, Washington, D.C., USA, Novem-
ber 27 December 1, 2006, 384-388
Bolfing, A., Michel, S., & Schwaninger, A. (2006a). Assessing image
difficulty in x-ray screening using image processing algorithms. Pro-
ceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Research in Air Trans-
portation, ICRAT 2006, Belgrade, Serbia and Montenegro, June 24-28,
2006, 253-258
Schwaninger, A., Michel, S., & Bolfing A. (2005). Towards a model for
estimating image difficulty in x-ray screening. IEEE ICCST Proceed-
ings, 39, 185-188
Technical Reports Bolfing, A., & Schwaninger, A. (2007). Measurement formulae for
image-based factors in x-ray imagery. VICOREG Technical Report,
November 26, 2007
Conference Abstracts Michel, S., Bolfing, A., & Schwaninger, A. (2005). Modelling image
based factors in aviation security x-ray screening. Poster presented at the
47. Tagung experimentell arbeitender Psychologen, April 4-6, Regens-
burg, Germany
Michel, S., Bolfing, A., Hofer, F., & Schwaninger, A. (2004). Towards
a Psychophysically Plausible Model of X-Ray Threat Detection Perfor-
mance. Poster presented at the 2nd LIDOKO (Lizentianden und Dok-
torandenkongress), Zurich
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Invited Lectures and Presentations Schwaninger, A., Bolfing, A., Halbherr, T., Helman,
S., Belyavin, A., & Hay L. (2008). The impact of im-
age based factors and training on threat detection per-
formance in X-ray screening. Proceedings of the 3rd
International Conference on Research in Air Trans-
portation, ICRAT 2008, Fairfax, Virginia, USA, June
1-4, 2008, 317-324
Bolfing, A. (2008). The Impact of Image Based Fac-
tors and Training on Threat Detection Performance in
X-ray Screening - a study involving 5 European air-
ports. InterTAG, May 27-29, Toulouse
Bolfing, A. (2007). Image-based factors that affect the
detection of threat items in x-ray images defined, VIA
Meeting, September 26-28, Berlin
Bolfing, A. (2007). VIA project screener’s survey re-
sults (workpackage 4), VIA Meeting, September 26-
28, Berlin
Bolfing, A. (2007). VIA project screener’s survey re-
sults (workpackage 5), VIA Meeting, September 26-
28, Berlin
Bolfing, A., Michel, S., & Schwaninger, A. (2006).
Assessing image difficulty in x-ray screening using
image processing algorithms. Proceedings of the 2nd
International Conference on Research in Air Trans-
portation, ICRAT 2006, Belgrade, Serbia and Mon-
tenegro, June 24-28, 2006, 253-258
